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ABSTRACT
AMY PINKHAM: Do Similar Neural Profiles Underlie Social Cognitive Deficits in 
Schizophrenia and High-functioning Autism?
(Under the direction of David Penn, Ph.D.)
Previous research suggests that schizophrenia and autism share similar behavioral 
deficits in social cognition.  This study investigated both neural activation and behavioral 
performance during a task of complex social cognition in healthy controls, individuals with 
high-functioning autism, and individuals with schizophrenia.  Event-related functional 
magnetic resonance imaging was utilized as individuals viewed faces and made ratings of 
trustworthiness.  It was hypothesized that both clinical groups would show reduced activation 
in discrete brain regions comprising a social cognitive neural circuit, which included the 
amygdala, the fusiform face area (FFA) of the fusiform gyrus, and the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS).  Activation in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) was also examined 
as this area has been implicated in the process of making evaluative judgments.  Results 
largely confirmed the main study hypothesis: both clinical groups showed significant 
reductions in neural activation while making complex social judgments compared to non-
clinical controls.  Significant reductions for both clinical groups were evident in the right 
amygdala and FFA and left VLPFC, and no differences in neural activation were evident 
between the clinical groups.  Behavioral performance on the Trustworthiness task 
significantly differed only between control individuals and individuals with schizophrenia; 
the two clinical groups did not significantly differ from one another.  These findings suggest 
iii
that individuals with schizophrenia and individuals with autism share similar neural 
abnormalities that may underlie social cognitive deficits.  
iv
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The direct comparison of schizophrenia and autism enjoys a varied history in which 
the focus has primarily been differentiating the two disorders diagnostically.  Recently 
however, investigators have shifted their attention to similarities between the disorders that 
suggest similar underlying pathologies.  For instance, Goldstein and colleagues (2002) found 
similar cognitive profiles for individuals with high functioning autism and individuals with 
schizophrenia, and Sheitman, Kraus, Bodfish, and Carmel (2004) demonstrated that autistic 
symptoms can be present in schizophrenia and that these symptoms covary with negative 
symptoms.  Similarly, Konstantareas and Hewitt (2001) noted that half of the autistic 
individuals in their sample met criteria for disorganized schizophrenia and that individuals 
with autism are likely to have several negative symptoms such as affective flattening, alogia, 
and asociality that are present in schizophrenia.  These cognitive and symptom similarities 
provide a firm foundation for continued comparisons and open the door for evaluations 
across several other domains that may also speak to shared mechanisms underlying the 
disorders.  Two such related areas are social functioning and the cognitive processes that 
subserve social functioning (i.e. social cognition).
Impairments in social functioning are characteristic of several psychological 
disorders; but nowhere are they more pronounced than in schizophrenia and autism.  
Impaired social functioning is a primary criterion for receiving a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
2(DSM- IV; APA, 1994), and individuals with schizophrenia often experience difficulties in 
multiple areas of social functioning such as interpersonal relationships, work and personal 
achievement, and self-care (Corrigan & Penn, 2001).  Such deficits are present throughout 
the course of the disorder, including the first-episode, and are often resistant to psychiatric 
intervention (Addington & Addington, 2000).  Additionally, social dysfunction has been 
found to precede the onset of psychosis and has been identified in individuals with a 
biological parent who has schizophrenia, both of which suggest that social impairments are 
vulnerability markers for developing schizophrenia (Davidson et al., 1999; Hans, Auerbach, 
Asarnow, Styr, & Marcus, 2000).   In addition to a contributing role in the development of 
schizophrenia, poor social functioning has been linked to an increased rate of relapse 
(Perlick, Stastny, Mattis, & Teresi, 1992).  Thus, it appears that impairments in social 
functioning represent a core behavioral feature of schizophrenia.  
Similarly, social dysfunction is primary to autism and Asperger’s Syndrome.  As with 
schizophrenia, impairments in social interaction are among the diagnostic criteria for both 
disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994), and adults with autism spectrum disorders show 
impairments in social relationships, competency at work, independence, and social 
competence in general (Green, Gilchrist, Burton, & Cox, 2000; Howlin, Mawhood, & Rutter, 
2000).   Moreover, research examining the Broad Autism Phenotype, a dimensional approach 
to autistic symptomatology stating that autistic features can be present to a lesser, sub-clinical 
degree in non-affected relatives of individuals with autism, also demonstrates that social 
deficits are present in the parents of affected children (Murphy et al., 2000; Piven, Palmer, 
Jacobi, Childress, & Arndt, 1997), which mirrors the biological vulnerability shown in 
schizophrenia.  These findings further underscore the importance of social dysfunction in 
3autism spectrum disorders.  
In an effort to better understand the processes underlying social dysfunction in both 
schizophrenia and autism, attention has been given to the role of neurocognitive abilities (e.g. 
executive function) in supporting social behavior.  Although these theories have merit, some 
findings suggest that they are incomplete.  For instance, reviews of the literature do support 
an association, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, between neurocognition and 
psychosocial dysfunction in schizophrenia (Green, Kern et al., 2000; Penn et al., 1997); 
however, this relationship is only modest (Penn et al., 1997).  Likewise, neurocognitive 
theories of autism fall short in explaining how some individuals, in particular, those with 
HFA or Asperger’s, can have intact cognitive abilities but still be socially impaired (Green, 
Kern et al., 2000).  Because of these modest associations and inconsistencies, investigators 
have more recently sought to examine specific and unique aspects of cognition that underlie 
social function and that may be distinct from traditional neurocognitive domains.  One such 
aspect that has been targeted in both disorders is social cognition.   
Here, I will present an overview of social cognition in schizophrenia and autism and, 
while placing particular emphasis on the neural mechanisms subserving social cognition, 
highlight evidence that suggests that a similar neural profile may underlie social cognitive 
deficits in both disorders.  I will begin by reviewing the concept of social cognition and 
underscoring how social cognition differs from traditional neurocognitive domains.  I will 
then briefly discuss the relevance of social cognitive deficits in both schizophrenia and 
autism followed by a review of the neural structures implicated in social cognitive processes 
in both clinical and non-clinical populations.  Here, particular emphasis will be placed on the 
role of the amygdala in making complex social judgments and on research that informs the 
4possibility of amygdala dysfunction in schizophrenia and autism.  Finally, conclusions 
regarding potential social cognitive and neural similarities between autism and schizophrenia 
will be discussed, and hypotheses for the proposed study will be provided.    
Social Cognition
Social cognition refers broadly to the cognitive processes involved in how individuals 
perceive, interpret, and process social information.  Definitions of social cognition vary 
widely in complexity and specificity, however two primary definitions include “the mental 
operations underlying social interactions, which include the human ability to perceive the 
intentions and dispositions of others” (Brothers, 1990, p. 28) and “the processes that subserve 
behavior in response to conspicifics, and in particular, to those higher cognitive processes 
suberving the extremely diverse and flexible social behaviors that are seen in primates” 
(Adolphs, 1999a).  These definitions, and others, firmly link social cognition to social 
behavior and highlight the potential role that deficits in social cognition may play in social 
dysfunction.  Further, several different specific skills comprise the domain of social cognition 
and thus support a multidimensional view of the construct.  These skills include emotion 
recognition, social cue perception, theory of mind (ToM), and attributional style. 
Evidence for the relative independence of social cognition from traditional 
neurocognitive skills can be garnered from both lesion studies and examinations of clinical 
populations.  To begin, individuals with either frontal or prefrontal cortex damage show 
impaired social behavior and functioning despite the retention of intact cognitive skills such 
as memory and language (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; Fine, Lumsden, & Blair, 2001).  Similarly, individuals with lesions in the 
somatic marker circuitry show low emotional and social intelligence and disturbances in 
5social functioning regardless of normative levels of cognitive intelligence (Bar-On, Tranel, 
Denburg, & Bechara, 2003).  The fact that social cognition can become selectively impaired 
while sparing nonsocial cognition suggests that unique neural circuits subserve social 
cognition.  Additionally, lesions to ventromedial occipital cortex can result in prosopagnosia, 
a condition in which individuals show selective impairments in the perception of faces but 
preserved perception for nonsocial stimuli.  Such findings have led some to suggest that 
facial processing is the result of domain specific neural mechanisms (Kanwisher, 2000).  
This conclusion is bolstered by studies of clinical populations, specifically individuals 
with Williams' syndrome (WS) and individuals with autism, that show a dissociation between 
social cognitive and nonsocial cognitive skills in these groups.  Individuals with WS tend to 
be outgoing and social, despite having below normal intelligence (Jones et al., 2000), and 
these individuals appear to have relatively preserved basic social cognitive skills (i.e., facial 
processing and simple Theory of Mind abilities, Karmiloff-Smith, 2000), despite having 
deficits in spatial cognition (Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, & Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Tager-Flushberg, Boshart, & Baron-Cohen, 1998).  Recent work examining specific neural 
structures in individuals with WS has attempted to explore this dissociation.  Reiss and 
colleagues (2004) used structural neuroimaging to examine volumetric abnormalities in 
neural structures included in the visual-spatial system and the neural structures most 
commonly implicated in face and emotion processing.  Results indicated that as compared to 
healthy persons, individuals with WS showed decreased volume and gray matter densities in 
several regions comprising the visual-spatial system and increased volume and gray matter 
density in regions thought to subserve face and emotion processing, including the amygdala 
and superior temporal gyrus.  These findings provide striking evidence for the independence 
6of social and nonsocial cognitive systems.  
The partial preservation of social cognition seen in WS is in direct contrast to persons 
with High Functioning Autism and Asperger's syndrome, who show specific impairments in 
social cognition and social behavior that may not be related to general cognitive abilities 
(Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000; Klin, 2000).  As with WS, these findings 
lend support for the hypothesis that specific neural modules exist that are devoted to the 
processing of social information, a hypothesis that has also been maintained in the areas of 
evolutionary biology and primatology (Adolphs, 2001; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Frith & 
Frith, 1999; Penn et al., 1997; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003a; 2003b).  
Social cognition has been studied widely in both schizophrenia and autism.  The 
following sections will present a brief review of work exploring social cognitive deficits in 
schizophrenia and the functional significance of these deficits.  The autism literature will 
then be reviewed using a parallel structure.  
Social Cognition in Schizophrenia
Social Cognitive Deficits and Biases in Schizophrenia
The study of social cognition in schizophrenia has generally focused on three primary 
domains of social functioning: theory of mind, attributional style, and social perception, 
which includes emotion recognition (Penn, Addington, & Pinkham, 2006).  In recent years, 
each of these three domains has received considerable attention; however, in keeping with 
the focus of this proposal, the majority of this review will be devoted to social perception 
whereas theory of mind and attributional style will be covered only briefly.
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to represent the mental states of others 
7and/or to make inferences about another’s intentions.  Skills that fall under the rubric of ToM 
include understanding false beliefs, hints, intentions, deception, metaphor, irony, and faux 
pas.  Relative to non-clinical and clinical control participants (i.e. individuals with depression 
or mania), individuals with schizophrenia perform poorly on tasks that measure ToM abilities 
(Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995; Drury, Robinson, & Birchwood, 1998; Frith & Corcoran, 
1996; Marjoram et al., 2005; Pilowsky, Yirmiya, Arbelle, & Mozes, 2000; Sarfati & Hardy-
Bayle, 1999; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, Brunet, & Widloecher, 1999; Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, 
Nadel, Chevalier, & Widloecher, 1997; reviewed in Corcoran, 2001), and on the whole, these 
deficits are independent of a general cognitive deficit (Brunet, Sarfati, & Hardy-Balye, 2003; 
Doody, Gotz, Johnstone, Frith, & Cunningham-Owens, 1998; Mazza, De-Risio, Surian, 
Roncone, & Casacchia, 2001; Pickup & Frith, 2001; Schenkel, Spaulding, & Silverstein, 
2005; see Brune, 2003 and Greig, Bryson, & Bell, 2004 for exceptions).  Impairments in 
ToM skills appear to be most profound among individuals with negative features, passivity 
symptoms, behavioral signs, disorganization, and paranoid symptoms (Corcoran et al., 1995; 
Greig et al., 2004; Harrington, Langdon, Siegert, & McClure, 2005; Pickup & Frith, 2001); 
however, increasing evidence suggests that the degree of deficit may vary as a function of 
symptom and difficulty of ToM task (Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Mazza et al., 2001).  This 
suggests that ToM is sensitive to the heterogeneity of schizophrenia.  Finally, evidence is 
mixed regarding whether these deficits represent trait or state characteristics (Harrington, 
Siegert, & McClure, 2005).  Several studies using a variety of ToM tasks have demonstrated 
that individuals who are in remission perform comparably to controls (Corcoran, 2003; Drury 
et al., 1998, Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Pickup & Frith, 2001), which would support a state 
deficit.  In contrast, Herold and colleagues (2002) noted that remitted individuals were 
8successful on simple ToM tasks but impaired on more complicated tasks, and other studies 
have found that the first-degree relatives of individuals with schizophrenia perform worse 
than non-clinical controls on ToM tasks (Janssen, Krabbendam, Jolles, & van Os, 2003; 
Wykes, Hamid, & Wagstaff, 2001) and that children who later develop schizophrenia 
perform poorly on measures assessing components of ToM (Schiffman et al., 2004), all of 
which lend support to a trait hypothesis.  
Attributional Style
The majority of work on attributions in schizophrenia has focused on investigating 
attributional style in individuals with paranoia or persecutory delusions.  From this work, two 
attributional biases have most commonly been observed: a self-serving bias and a 
personalizing bias.  Bentall and colleages (2001) have argued that individuals with 
persecutory delusions tend to show an exaggerated self-serving bias in which negative 
outcomes are attributed to others and positive outcomes to one's own actions (for partial 
failures to replicate this finding, see Kristev, Jackson, & Maude, 1999 and Martin & Penn, 
2002), although this effect may be stronger for attributing negative outcomes to others, rather 
than taking credit for success (Garety & Freeman, 1999).  A personalizing bias is evidenced 
by individuals with paranoia in that for negative interpersonal events, these individuals are 
more likely to blame others, rather than the situation or circumstances, relative to persons 
without paranoia and/or persecutory delusions (Bentall, 2001; Craig, Hatton, Craig, & 
Bentall, 2004; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997).  Additionally, this bias may be most pronounced 
in individuals who are acutely ill rather than individuals whose symptoms are in remission 
(Randall, Corcoran, Day, & Bentall, 2003).
9Social Perception
Studies of social perception in schizophrenia can be broken down into two general 
areas: facial affect recognition and social cue perception.  Reviews of the literature on facial 
affect recognition (i.e., Edwards, Jackson, & Pattison, 2002; Hellewell & Whittaker, 1998; 
Kohler & Brennan, 2004; Mandal, Pandey, & Prasad, 1998; Penn et al. 1997) suggest the 
following conclusions.  First, individuals with schizophrenia have deficits in facial affect 
perception compared to non-clinical control participants.  Second, these deficits are present 
relative to individuals with other psychiatric disorders such as depressive disorder (Wenger, 
Lange, Ruther, & Irle, 2004); however, results are inconsistent when compared to disorders 
that include psychotic features such as bipolar disorder.  Third, greater impairment is evident 
for the perception of negative emotional displays compared to positive displays, with perhaps 
the greatest impairment for the perception of fear (Edwards, Pattison, Jackson, & Wales, 
2001; Evangeli & Broks, 2000; Kohler et al., 2003).  Fourth, longitudinal studies support a 
stable deficit in emotion perception (Addington & Addington, 1998; Gaebel & Wolwer, 
1992; Kee, Green, Mintz, & Brekke, 2003; Kucharska-Pietura & Klimkowski, 2002); 
although, there is some evidence that individuals whose symptoms are in remission may 
perform better on affect perception tasks than individuals in an acute phase of the disorder 
(Gessler, Cutting, Frith, & Weinman, 1989; Penn et al., 2000).  Fifth, there is some evidence 
that individuals with paranoid schizophrenia are better at facial affect perception than 
individuals with non-paranoid subtypes of the disorder (Davis & Gibson, 2000; Kline, Smith, 
& Ellis, 1992; Lewis & Garver, 1995; see Mandal & Rai, 1987 for an exception). Sixth, 
when viewing faces, individuals with schizophrenia display restricted visual scan paths 
(Loughland, Williams, & Gordon, 2002a; Streit, Wolwer, & Gaebel, 1997; Williams, 
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Loughland, Gordon, & Davidson, 1999; Williams, Loughland, Green, Harris, & Gordon, 
2003) and spend less time examining salient features of the face (Loughland, Williams, & 
Gordon, 2002b; Phillips & David, 1997; Phillips & David, 1998; Williams et al., 1999), 
which may contribute to poor performance (Loughland et al., 2002a; 2002b; Williams et al., 
1999).  And finally, the jury is still out regarding whether facial affect perception deficits are 
part of a generalized performance deficit (Baudouin, Martin, Tiberghien, Verlut, & Franck, 
2002; Bellack, Blanchard, & Mueser, 1996; Kerr & Neale, 1993; Mueser et al., 1996; Sachs, 
Steger-Wuchse, Kryspin-Exner, Gur, & Katschnig, 2004; Salem, Kring, & Kerr, 1996) or 
specific to decoding only facial emotions (e.g., Heimberg, Gur, Erwin, Shatasel, & Gur, 
1992; Penn et al., 2000).
Unlike facial affect recognition stimuli, tasks that assess social cue perception utilize 
more dynamic stimuli that require multiple sensory modalities, and consistent with work on 
facial affect perception, individuals with schizophrenia are generally impaired in general 
social perception (Archer, Hay, & Young, 1994).  Bell, Bryson, and Lysaker (1997) 
evaluated the performance of individuals with schizophrenia on a task of emotion recognition 
in which an actor portrayed a basic emotion through facial expression, verbal tone, and 
upper-body movements while reciting one of three standardized monologues.  They found 
that individuals in the schizophrenia sample performed significantly worse than individuals 
with substance abuse and healthy control participants.  Corrigan, Davies-Farmer, and Stolley 
(1990) also found that individuals with nonparanoid schizophrenia were impaired in 
accurately recognizing social cues from vignettes of social interactions.  
Deficits in social cue perception also appear to be most pronounced for the perception 
of abstract, rather than concrete, cues.  Concrete social cues involve observations of an 
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actor’s behavior (e.g., “what is she doing?”) and characteristics (e.g., “what is she wearing?”) 
whereas abstract cues consist of inferences of affect and goals.  In a series of studies, 
Corrigan and colleagues have found that individuals with schizophrenia are more sensitive 
to, and better able to recognize, concrete social cues rather than abstract ones (Corrigan, 
Garman, & Nelson, 1996; Corrigan & Green, 1993a; Corrigan & Green, 1993b; Corrigan & 
Nelson, 1998; Corrigan, Silverman, Stephenson, Nugent-Hirschbeck, & Buican, 1996), a 
finding consistent with what we would expect from individuals who have difficulties in 
discerning the intentions of others (i.e., Theory of Mind skills).
A third category of social perception that is just recently receiving attention is the 
perception of stimuli requiring complex social judgments.  As knowledge of basic emotion 
perception abilities has grown, researchers have become increasingly interested in more 
complex, real-life social cognitive situations.  Thus, assessment methods and stimuli have 
become more sophisticated, requiring participants to draw upon several social cognitive 
abilities within the same task.  For example, the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste, & Plumb, 2001) incorporates both emotion perception and ToM abilities.  This task
consists of still frames of the eye-region of faces depicting various social emotions and 
complex mental states; therefore, in order to perform well on the task, participants must be 
able to identify social emotions as well as make inferences about the intentions of the 
individual shown.  A similar task that requires participants to make complex mental 
judgments is the Trustworthiness/Approachability Task developed by Ralph Adolphs (1998).  
Here, participants are shown black and white photographs of individuals’ faces, and they are 
asked to rate how trustworthy and approachable they perceive each individual to be.  
Due to the relative newness of these tasks, they have not been widely incorporated 
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into the literature.  No studies have investigated the performance of individuals with 
schizophrenia on the Trustworthiness/Approachability Task, and only two have utilized the 
Eyes Task.  These studies are however largely consistent with the general findings for social 
perception.  Specifically, Craig et al. (2004) found that individuals with paranoid 
schizophrenia performed significantly worse than healthy controls on the Eyes Task and that 
this effect remained when controlling for IQ.  Likewise, Oguz and colleagues (2003) found 
similar performance deficits for individuals with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder 
that were not correlated with IQ.  Finally, in a later study, Oguz et al. (2005) also found poor 
performance on the Eyes Task was associated with the severity of negative symptoms. 
The Functional Significance of Social Cognition in Schizophrenia
As noted previously, investigators turned their attention to social cognition in the 
hopes of identifying factors that underlie social functioning, and thus far, several studies have 
confirmed that a relationship does exist between social cognition and social functioning.  To 
begin, relationships with various aspects of social functioning have been clearly elucidated 
for affect recognition.  For instance, Kee et al. (2003) reported that emotion perception was 
related to work functioning and independent living, and Poole, Tobias, and Vinogradov 
(2000) found that errors in affect recognition were correlated with lower quality of life and 
impoverished interpersonal relations.  Hooker and Park (2002) also reported that emotion 
perception abilities were associated with communication and occupational abilities. Another 
study found that, for inpatients, affect perception was related to social competence as 
assessed by social skill and social adjustment on the ward (Mueser et al., 1996).  In a similar 
study, Ihnen, Penn, Corrigan and Martin (1998) concluded that performance on emotion 
identification tests was associated not only with ratings of overall social skill, but also clarity 
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(clear enunciation of speech) and conversation involvement as assessed by a role play test.  
Finally, facial affect perception has also been associated with adaptive ward functioning, 
particularly hygiene and grooming (Penn, Spaulding, Reed, & Sullivan, 1996).  
While sparse, work attempting to link social cue perception to social functioning has 
also supported a relationship between the two.  Corrigan and Toomey (1995) found that 
sensitivity to social cues was associated with interpersonal problem-solving skills; however, 
a similar study by Ihnen et al. (1998) that attempted to link social cue perception to social 
skill found only a weak association.  This latter finding is somewhat contradictory to the 
findings of a study by Bellack and colleagues (1992).  Bellack et al. found that social 
perception was correlated with overall social skill but that this relationship held only in 
situations involving negative affect.  This caveat may explain the discrepancy between these 
two findings since Ihnen et al. did not examine negative affect situations.  Thus, there is 
some, albeit limited evidence, that social cue perception is related to social functioning.  
In addition, there is evidence that social knowledge and general social perception are 
related to social functioning among persons with schizophrenia.  Specifically, the ability to 
identify the sequence of behavioral steps used in social situations and to place them in the 
correct order was associated with less irritability on the ward among chronically ill patients 
(Penn et al., 1996) and persons recovering from an acute psychotic episode (Penn, Ritchie, 
Francis, Combs, & Martin, 2002).  Moreover, Appelo and colleagues (1992) reported that 
knowledge of social situations accounted for more variance in ward functioning than 
symptoms.
Finally, although research establishing and describing a ToM deficit in schizophrenia 
is abundant, only a few studies have examined the functional significance of these deficits.  
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In Brune (2005), ToM was found to account for 24% of the variance in severe social 
behavioral problems, and Roncone et al. (2002) found that ToM was related to global social 
functioning and that this relationship remained when controlling for IQ.  Roncone and 
colleagues also noted that ToM abilities accounted for more variance in social functioning 
than cognitive factors such as verbal fluency, memory, and executive function. Similarly, 
Pinkham and Penn (in press) reported that performance on measures of ToM was related to 
better overall social skill.   
Thus, there is growing evidence that social cognition is related to social impairments 
in schizophrenia, and the foregoing provides strong evidence for the functional significance 
of social cognition in schizophrenia.  Perhaps most impressive is that in a few studies 
(Corrigan & Toomey, 1995; Penn et al., 1999; Penn et al., 1996; Roncone et al., 2002), the 
association between social cognition and social functioning could not be accounted for by 
cognitive deficits.  These findings lend support to the hypothesis that social cognition 
contributes independent variance to functional outcomes beyond non-social cognition alone.
Social Cognition in Autism
Social Cognitive Deficits in Autism
As with schizophrenia, several domains of social cognition have been explored in 
autism, however, the two domains that have received the most attention are ToM and social 
perception.  Both social cognitive domains have been studied across the developmental 
course of autism and across the autism spectrum.  Where possible, this review will be limited 
to the literature exploring social cognitive deficits in adults with high-functioning autism and 
Asperger’s syndrome, and the majority of the review will be devoted to social perception.
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Theory of Mind
In autism, ToM deficits span the developmental period and remain present in 
adulthood, a finding which has prompted some to hypothesize that ToM impairments are a 
core feature of the disorder and the primary deficit in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 2001; Leslie & Frith, 1988; 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991).  These deficits are manifest in young children with 
autism as absent or delayed joint attention behaviors (Dawson et al., 2004; Morgan, 
Maybery, & Durkin, 2003) and as difficulty with pretend play (Jarrold, 2003; Rutherford & 
Rogers, 2003).  Later, children with autism spectrum disorders show difficulty with false 
belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Yirmiya, et al., 1998) and other more complex ToM 
abilities such as deception and faux pas (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 
1999; Brent, Rios, Happe, & Charman, 2004; Pilowsky et al., 2000).  Although ToM abilities 
remain impaired as compared to age matched typically developing individuals, some 
improvement over time does occur such that higher functioning adolescents and adults 
become able to pass first- and second-order false belief tasks (Bowler, 1992; Dahlgren & 
Trillingsgaard, 1996; Steele, Joseph, & Tager-Flushberg, 2003).  
Given that most adults with autism spectrum disorders are able to pass false belief 
tasks, more complicated tasks have been utilized to examine ToM abilities in older 
individuals.  Unfortunately, as these tasks have become more advanced, their specificity has 
declined thus making it increasingly difficult to conclude that they measure only ToM.  Two 
commonly used tasks that exemplify this are the Eyes Task mentioned earlier and the Social 
Attribution Task (SAT; Klin, 2000).  Both tasks are used as measures of ToM in the autism 
literature; however, a convincing argument can be made that they more accurately assess the 
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ability to make complex social judgments and include multiple social cognitive processes.  
As noted earlier, the Eyes task incorporates elements of emotion perception as well as ToM, 
and the SAT necessitates the attribution of biological motion as well as ToM.  Despite these 
complications, studies using these tasks will still be reviewed under the current ToM heading 
in order to remain consistent with the conclusions put forth by the authors of these studies.  
On the whole, studies of ToM abilities in adults with autism spectrum disorders have 
shown considerable deficits as compared to healthy controls.  A series of studies by Baron-
Cohen and colleagues has consistently shown that high functioning individuals with autism 
and Asperger’s syndrome are impaired on the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, 
& Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997).  
One of these, Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al. (1997), also utilized a clinical control group, 
individuals with Tourettes Syndrome, and still found impairments in ToM.  Likewise, other 
groups have used the Eyes Task in conjunction with other ToM tasks to demonstrate that 
ToM impairments in autism are not limited to the visual modality (Kleinman et al., 2001) and 
that these impairments extend beyond attributing a mental state to a face; they are also 
apparent when trying to infer the true meaning of a hint (Craig et al., 2004).  These overall 
deficits are confirmed by meta-analyses of studies examining ToM and appear to be present 
not only as compared to healthy individuals but to individuals with mental retardation as well 
(Yirmiya et al., 1998).
Finally, Klin (2000) expanded Baron-Cohen’s work by introducing the SAT that 
utilizes cartoon animations of geometrical shapes enacting a social plot and requires 
participants to narrate each animation.  Klin found that as compared to healthy controls, 
individuals with autism and Asperger syndrome were less likely to identify the social 
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elements of the story and to use ToM or affective terms in their narrations.  Moreover, he 
found that performance was not related to age or verbal ability.  These findings not only 
supported a general deficit in ToM abilities, but also that individuals with autism spectrum 
disorders may not naturally seek social meaning in the environment.  
Attributional Style
Although attributional style is under-researched in autism spectrum disorders, a few 
studies have attempted to apply the attributional model of paranoia to Asperger’s syndrome.  
Increased rates of paranoia are often seen clinically in individuals with Asperger’s syndrome 
(Hare 1997; Wing 1996), and given this similarity to psychotic disorders, two studies have 
investigated whether the attributional biases seen in schizophrenia are also be present in 
individuals with Asperger syndrome (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare, & Hatton, 2001; Craig et 
al., 2004).  Both studies found increased rates of paranoia as compared to healthy controls, 
however both also failed to find evidence of attributional biases.  Thus from these limited 
data, it appears that individuals with Asperger syndrome do not display any attributional 
abnormalities and that the paranoia seen in such individuals likely stems from mechanisms 
that differ from those of schizophrenia.  
Social Perception
As in schizophrenia research, the study of social perception in autism has focused on 
several different elements including the detection of biological motion, face perception, 
emotion perception, and the processing of complex social stimuli.  Varying degrees of 
attention have been devoted to each component of social perception, however, in general, 
individuals with autism have been found to perform abnormally on tasks assessing these 
abilities.  
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The ability to perceive biological motion is most commonly assessed using point-
light displays of human figures (i.e. Grossman & Blake, 1999), but other methods such as 
moving animated characters (Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004) and geometrical shapes 
moving in conjunction to mimic walking (Pelphrey, Mitchell, et al., 2003) have also been 
used.  To date, only point light displays have been utilized with an autistic sample, and the 
two studies that have done so have employed children.  Moore, Hobson, and Lee (1997) 
found that children with autism consistently performed more poorly than control participants 
in differentiating biological motion from the motion of inanimate objects.  A similar study 
confirmed this deficit in perceiving biological motion and found a positive correlation 
between degree of autistic symptomatology and impairment in detecting biological motion 
(Blake, Turner, Smoski, Pozdol, & Stone, 2003).  Unfortunately, it would be premature to 
conclude that these deficits will persist into adulthood, but these studies do provide a 
foundation upon which such a hypothesis could be based.   
Beyond perceiving biological motion, investigators have also examined how 
individuals with autism process human faces.  Early work in this area made note of the fact 
that individuals with autism fail to show an inversion effect for faces (Boucher & Lewis, 
1992; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988a; Langdell, 1978; Tantam, Monaghan, Nicholson, & 
Stirling, 1989), which in typical development refers to the tendency for individuals to show a 
processing advantage for faces shown in an upright orientation as opposed to faces shown 
upside down, or in an inverted orientation (see Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003 for a failure to 
replicate these findings with high functioning individuals).  Individuals with autism also fail 
to process faces holistically and instead tend to focus on individual features with a particular 
preference for the features of the lower face (Gross, 2004; Weeks & Hobson, 1987; see 
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Lahaie et al., 2006 for evidence of enhanced processing of facial features in autism).  
Examination of the visual scanpaths of individuals with autism also confirms an abnormal 
featural processing strategy.  Klin and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that when viewing 
social scenes, individuals with autism spend less time examining the eyes of actors in the 
scene and more time looking at the mouths of the actors or objects in the scene.  Pelphrey et 
al. (2002) also found that individuals with autism devote more time to viewing non-salient 
features of the face (i.e. the ear or chin) than core features of the face such as the eyes, nose, 
and mouth.  Interestingly, Pelphrey et al. monitored these visual scanpaths within the context 
of an emotion recognition task, and the behavioral results of this study indicated that 
individuals with autism correctly identified fewer emotions than controls.  Together, these 
results support the hypothesis that individuals with autism utilize abnormal strategies to 
process faces and that these strategies may contribute to impairments in face and emotion 
processing.  
The literature addressing emotion perception in autism is quite extensive and can be 
summarized as follows.  First, individuals with autism do show impairments in emotion 
recognition (Bolte & Poustka, 2003; Hall, Szechtman, & Nahmias, 2003; Howard et al., 
2000; Pelphrey et al., 2002).  Second, these impairments do not appear to be uniform across 
the autism spectrum; instead, there appears to be an interaction between level of functioning 
and difficulty of task.  Numerous studies have failed to find emotion recognition deficits in 
high functioning individuals when only basic emotions are used (Adolphs et al., 2001; 
Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 1993; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Ogai et 
al., 2003; Piggot et al., 2004; Volkmar, Sparrow, Rende, & Cohen, 1989); however, deficits 
do emerge when more complex emotions are processed (Capps, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992; 
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Grossman, Klin, Carter, & Volkmar, 2000; Pelphrey et al., 2002).  Further, Loveland et al. 
(1997) demonstrated that high functioning individuals performed better on emotion 
recognition tasks than lower functioning individuals, which has prompted some to conclude 
that high functioning individuals may be able use compensatory strategies to mask deficits 
when processing basic emotions (Teunisse & de Gelder, 2001).  Third, and as alluded to 
above, greater impairment is evident for more complex emotions such as fear, surprise, and 
complex social emotions (e.g. distrustful, accusing, and friendly) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Capps et al., 1992; Pelphrey et al., 2002).  Fourth, the evidence is 
mixed regarding whether this is a specific deficit (Celani, Battacchi, Arcidiacono, & Di-
Domenico, 1999; Hobson, 1986a; Hobson, 1986b; Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988b; Weeks & 
Hobson, 1987) or if it can be accounted for by more generalized deficits in face perception 
(Critchley, Daly, Bullmore, et al., 2000) or cognitive abilities (Ozonoff, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 1990).    
The last area of social perception is the processing of complex social stimuli.  Similar 
to the current trend in schizophrenia research, autism investigators have recently begun 
exploring the ability of individuals with autism to process stimuli in a manner that requires 
complex social judgments.  As can be recalled from the ToM review, several studies have 
utilized the Eyes Task to demonstrate that individuals with autism show deficits in 
recognizing social emotions and complex mental states.  Likewise, in an innovative study, 
Adolphs and colleagues (2001) administered the Trustworthiness/Approachability task to a 
sample of high functioning individuals with autism.  On average, individuals with autism 
gave abnormally high ratings of trustworthiness and approachability to unfamiliar faces.  
From this, Adolphs et al. concluded that individuals with autism may be impaired in the 
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processes necessary for higher-level social cognition and that they may fail to link social 
judgments to the perception of a face.  Studies such as these are the first of their kind to use 
tasks that are sensitive to, and that target, subtle impairments in social cognition.
The Functional Significance of Social Cognition in Autism
As compared to schizophrenia, less emphasis has been placed on understanding the 
impact of social cognition on functioning in autism; however, the studies that have examined 
this question do support a relationship between social cognitive abilities and social 
functioning.  Specifically, ToM abilities have been linked to social behavior in children with 
autism (Frith, Happe, & Siddons, 1994; Hughes, Soares-Boucaud, Hochmann, & Frith, 
1997), and various elements of social perception have also been shown to correlate with 
social functioning in individuals with autism and individuals with pervasive developmental 
disorders (PDD).  In the Klin et al. (2002) study examining the visual fixation patterns of 
individuals with autism while viewing social scenes, the authors found that more time 
fixating on objects in the scene instead of the actors was related to poorer social adjustment.  
Additionally, Fein and colleagues (1992) noted that emotion perception abilities were 
correlated with level of social skill in individuals with PDD, and a similar study by 
Braverman and colleagues (1989) also reported that deficits in emotion perception were 
related to greater social impairment.  
The Neurobiology of Social Cognition
In 1990, Brothers proposed a neural system of social cognition that was comprised of 
the orbito-frontal cortex, the superior temporal sulcus, and the amygdala.  This seminal paper 
led to numerous studies that have generally confirmed the role of these neural structures in 
social information processing (Adolphs, 2001; Adolphs, 2002; Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 
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2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1994; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998), as well as several 
others that may play secondary roles (i.e. the right parietal cortex, the insular cortex, the 
basal ganglia, (Adolphs, 2002) and the temporal-parietal junction at the top of the superior 
temporal gyrus, and the temporal poles, (Frith, 2001)).  Although these neural structures also 
subserve other cognitive functions (e.g., problem solving; conceptual reasoning), they, and 
not other neural structures, tend to be most consistently activated in response to social 
stimuli, thus underscoring their role in neural models of social cognition.  In what follows, I 
will briefly describe the major neural structures and mechanisms that have consistently 
shown a role in social cognition, particularly those structures implicated in ToM and social 
perception.  An in depth treatment of each brain region would far exceed the scope of this 
paper; thus, I will limit this discussion to the specific areas proposed by Brothers (1990) and 
Adolphs (1999a; 2001; 2002) as subserving social cognition: the medial prefrontal cortex, the 
superior temporal sulcus, the fusiform gyrus, and the amygdala.  Finally, in keeping with the 
focus of this project, research elucidating the role of the amygdala in social perception will 
be reviewed in the most detail.  
The Frontal Cortices and Theory of Mind
There is growing evidence that performance on ToM tasks is associated with 
activation of specific frontal cortical regions, in particular, the medial frontal cortex and the 
medial prefrontal cortex.  A limited number of studies also support the role of the orbito-
frontal cortex in ToM.  Early studies that attempted to localize ToM in the brain examined 
regions that were activated in healthy participants during a ToM task.  Fletcher et al. (1995) 
used positron emission tomography (PET) to reveal a unique activation of Brodmann’s areas 
(BA) 8 and 9 in the left medial frontal cortex during a verbal ToM task that was not present 
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during similar non-ToM tasks.  Similarly, Goel, Grafman, Sadato, and Hallett (1995) found 
selective activation of the left medial frontal cortex (BA 9) throughout a ToM task in which 
normal participants were asked to infer the thoughts of a contemporary of Christopher 
Columbus.  Thus, results from these early studies indicated that ToM was specific to the 
medial frontal cortex (see also Calarge, Andreasen, & O’Leary, 2003; Stuss, Gallup, & 
Alexander, 2001 for more recent support of the role of the medial frontal cortex in ToM).  
More recent studies have used both verbal and nonverbal tasks in their experimental 
design, and have supported the role of the prefrontal cortex (McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, 
& Trouard, 2001; Vogeley et al., 2001), specifically the medial prefrontal cortex, including 
portions of BA 8 and 9, in ToM skills.  Gallagher and colleagues (2000) used functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess brain activity while participants read and 
answered theory of mind questions about a verbal passage, and interpreted and explained the 
meaning of cartoons that required theory of mind skills.  Relative to control conditions, there 
was unique activation of the medial prefrontal cortex during the ToM tasks.  Similar results 
were found using only a cartoon task (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2000).  
Additionally, the medial prefrontal cortex has also been implicated in ToM tasks that use 
non-human stimuli and tasks that do not explicitly ask participants to interpret the mental 
states of others.  For example, Castelli and colleagues (2000; 2002) found that the medial 
prefrontal cortex was selectively activated when the movement patterns of geometric shapes 
evoked mental state attribution but not during simple action description.  German, Niehaus, 
Roarty, Giesbrecht, and Miller (2004) also found increased activity in the medial prefrontal 
cortex when subjects viewed pretend actions as opposed to real actions (recall that 
understanding of pretense is a developmental precursor to ToM).
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Additional studies have also implicated the orbito-frontal cortex in ToM skills.  
Baron-Cohen et al. (1994) used single photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT) 
to identify areas of activation during performance on a mental state terms task (a ToM task).  
They found increased cerebral blood flow in the right orbito-frontal cortex of healthy 
participants during a ToM task, but not during a control task.  Lesion studies also lend 
support to this pattern of findings.  Stone et al. (1998) found that individuals with bilateral 
orbito-frontal lesions performed similarly to individuals with Asperger’s syndrome on a task 
requiring the recognition of a faux pas, a task that requires social reasoning as well as theory 
of mind.  And, Mah, Arnold, and Grafman (2004) found that individuals with lesions to the 
orbitofrontal/anterior cingulate cortex were impaired in the detection of lies, also a process 
that requires ToM.  Collectively, the these studies suggest that activation of the medial 
prefrontal cortex, and to some extent, the orbito-frontal cortex, is critical to being able to 
infer the mental states of others (see Frith, 2001, for two additional brain regions that are 
activated during ToM tasks but that are not within the scope of this paper).  
The Fusiform Gyrus and Superior Temporal Sulcus in Face Processing
Several recent reviews have established that specific regions of the brain are 
associated with face processing.  Among these are the lateral fusiform gyrus (FG) and the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Adolphs, 2001; Adolphs, 2002; Allison et al., 2000).  The 
lateral FG subserves selective activation to faces (Aylward et al., 2005; Chao, Martin, & 
Haxby, 1999; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & McCarthy, 1996; Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & 
Puce, 2004) as opposed to objects, and because of this area’s specificity and the consistency 
with which it has been linked to face recognition, it has been dubbed the “fusiform face area” 
(although the specificity of the FG for faces has been contested, see Blonder et al., 2004; 
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Gauthier, Curran, Curby, & Collins, 2003; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000).  
Additionally, the FG activates strongly during tasks focusing on identity and appears to be 
most involved in the processing of non-changeable, static aspects of the face (Haxby, 
Hoffmann, & Gobbini, 2000; Winston, Henson, Fine-Goulden, & Dolan, 2004). 
In contrast, the STS is more strongly activated during tasks focusing on visual gaze 
shifts (Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic, & Ngan, 2004; Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 
2003; Pelphrey, Viola, & McCarthy, 2004) and is involved in processing the changeable 
aspects of the face such as the eyes and the mouth (Haxby et al., 2000; Winston et al., 2004).  
Such a distinction between the static and dynamic features of the face is important because it 
is the dynamic features that provide the most social information.  Changes in the direction of 
gaze indicate the focus of one’s attention, and changes in the shape of the eyes and mouth 
facilitate emotional expression, and indicate emotions such as happiness and aggression.
The Amygdala and Complex Social Perception
Both lesion and imaging studies have consistently supported the role of the amygdala 
in detecting threat, recognizing emotions, and making complex social judgments.  
Specifically, evidence from both primates and humans strongly implicates the amygdala in 
the evaluation of potential danger (Amaral et al., 2003), and human individuals with damage 
to the amygdala are also noted to have difficulty recognizing faces and judging the emotional 
expressions of others, particularly when that expression is fear (Adolphs, Tranel, Hamann et 
al., 1999; Calder et al., 1996; Haxby et al., 2000; Whalen et al., 2004; Young et al., 1995).  
Interestingly, this impairment in recognizing fear can be present despite intact face identity 
recognition (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995) and intact recognition of verbally 
expressed emotion (Adolphs & Tranel, 1999; Anderson & Phelps, 1998), and also extends to 
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recognizing the intensity of fearful expressions (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 
1994).  Although these studies and others (Anderson & Phelps, 2000; Broks et al., 1998) 
support a specific impairment in the recognition of fear, several more recent studies have 
found similar deficits for other negatively valanced emotions such as sadness and anger.  
Schmolck and Squire (2001) noted that patients with bilateral amygdala lesions had difficulty 
discriminating negative emotions and often mistook fear for surprise or anger and sadness for 
disgust or anger.  Similarly, in two different studies, Adolphs and Tranel also found that 
individuals with bilateral lesions show a specific impairment in recognizing sadness as 
opposed to happiness (2004), and that individuals with bilateral amygdala damage are more 
likely to falsely identify anger as happiness (2003).  
Functional neuroimaging studies utilizing healthy participants have largely confirmed 
and extended the findings from lesion studies.  Using PET, Morris et al. (1996) found a 
differential response in the amygdala to fear and happiness.  Amygdalar activation was much 
more pronounced when participants viewed photographs of fearful faces, and there appeared 
to be an interaction between level of activation and intensity of emotion such that the more 
fearful a face looked, the greater the level of activation.  Using fMRI, Phillips et al. (1997) 
explored the differential amygdalar response to fear by comparing activation in response to 
fearful and disgusted facial expression whereas Breiter and colleagues (1996) compared 
fearful and neutral expressions.  Results from both studies indicated that the amygdala was 
only activated when viewing fearful faces and not when viewing disgusted and neutral faces, 
respectively.  Similarly, Whalen et al. (2004) found significantly greater activation of the 
amygdala in response to fearful eye whites as compared to happy eye whites.      
Other imaging studies have further elucidated the role of the amygdala by 
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demonstrating that it is maximally engaged during automatic or rapid processing of faces.  
Whalen et al. (1998) presented photographs of happy and fearful expressions in a backward 
masking procedure that resulted in the majority of participants being unaware of seeing 
fearful and happy expressions, and despite lack of conscious awareness, significantly greater 
amygdalar activation was noted in response to fearful faces.  Likewise, Critchley, Daly, 
Phillips et al. (2000) compared explicit and implicit facial emotion processing and found that 
implicit processing activated the amygdala to a greater extent than explicit processing.  
Indeed, Hariri et al. (2000) noted that asking participants to actively label emotional 
expressions might actually result in deactivation of the amygdala, a finding that has been 
mirrored in investigations of automatic and controlled social evaluation (Cunningham et al., 
2004).  Overall, findings from both lesion and imaging studies clearly indicate that the 
amygdala is important for emotion recognition and suggest that the amygdala may play a 
disproportionate role in the automatic processing of negative or threatening stimuli (Adophs 
et al., 1999). 
Closely related to basic emotion recognition and threat perception, the amygdala has 
also been implicated in the process of making complex social judgments such as identifying 
social emotions and assessing the trustworthiness and approachability of a social other.  
Social emotions can be distinguished from basic emotions (i.e. happy, sad, angry, afraid, etc.) 
in that they only make sense within the context of a social relationship, and thus would 
include emotions such as arrogant, guilty, admiring, and flirtatious.  It appears that when 
required to process social emotions, individuals with amygdala damage show even more 
severe impairments that those seen when processing only basic emotions, a finding which 
suggests that the amygdala may be specialized for processing stimuli with important social 
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significance (Adolphs, Baron-Cohen, & Tranel, 2002).  An interesting line of research 
examining the role of the amygdala in evaluating trustworthiness supports this view; both 
lesion and imaging studies have established that the amygdala is integral to making such 
social judgments.  First, Adolphs et al. (1998) asked three individuals with complete bilateral 
amygdala damage and seven individuals with unilateral amygdala damage to rate faces for 
approachability and trustworthiness.  All three bilateral participants judged the faces to be 
more approachable and trustworthy than control participants, and this was most notable for 
faces that the control participants rated the least approachable and trustworthy.  In contrast, 
individuals with unilateral lesions performed comparably to control participants.  Taken 
together, these results seem to imply that only unilateral activation of the amygdala, as 
opposed to bilateral activation, is necessary for accurate processing of trustworthiness stimuli 
and that this processing is not highly lateralized.  A functional imaging study of healthy 
individuals lends credence to this conclusion.  Winston and colleagues (2002) found bilateral 
activation of the amygdala in response to untrustworthy faces, and interestingly, faces rated 
as the most untrustworthy evoked greater amygdalar response.  Thus, as can be seen from 
these studies, the amygdala is not limited to the processing of basic emotions but also plays a 
critical role in complex social judgment.
The Neural Correlates of Social Cognition in Schizophrenia and Autism
The strong link between neural structures and specific social cognitive abilities 
presents several interesting implications for pathology and raises the possibility that the 
social cognitive deficits seen in autism and schizophrenia could be related to abnormal 
functioning in these particular structures.  In what follows, studies that explore structural and 
functional neural abnormalities in schizophrenia and autism will be detailed.  To remain 
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consistent with the focus of this project, only those structures primarily involved in social 
perception will be reviewed, however, please see Pinkham, Penn, Perkins, and Leiberman 
(2003) for a review of the frontal cortices and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in 
schizophrenia. 
The FG, STS, and Amygdala in Schizophrenia
Fusiform Gyrus
In general, the fusiform gyrus shows decreased volume and abnormal activation in 
persons with schizophrenia.  First, both McDonald et al. (2000) and Paillere-Martinot et al. 
(2001) found decreased regional gray matter in the left fusiform gyrus of individuals with 
schizophrenia as compared to healthy controls, and their findings have been replicated in 
both chronic (Onitsuka et al., 2003) and first-episode samples (Lee et al., 2002; although see 
Pinkham et al., 2005 for a failure to replicate).  Second, several studies show reduced 
activation of the FG while viewing faces (see Hempel et al., 2003 for conflicting results).  
Both Streit et al. (2001) and Quintana et al. (2003) reported that individuals with 
schizophrenia show reduced activation of the right lateral FG during emotion perception 
tasks as compared to healthy individuals.  Moreover, a study by Williams et al., (2004) found 
reduced activation of the FG bilaterally as compared to healthy individuals.  It is also 
interesting to note that Malaspina and colleagues (1999) report increased rCBF in the right 
fusiform gyrus during a visual fixation task.  Although the latter finding may initially seem 
counterintuitive, one must consider that increased rCBF was not present in healthy control 
participants and in this respect, may indicate an abnormality in individuals with 
schizophrenia.  Additionally, the fact that individuals with schizophrenia display reduced 
activation during social cognitive tasks and increased rCBF during a nonsocial task would 
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suggest that the FG of individuals with schizophrenia may not be specialized for social 
stimuli.  
Superior Temporal Sulcus
Unfortunately, very little work has spoken to either STS volume or functioning in 
schizophrenia, and the only study that has done so utilized a ToM task instead of a social 
perception measure.  In this study, Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, and Decety (2003) asked 
participants to choose concluding frames for comic strips that required the understanding of 
intentions or physical causality.  Despite the absence of moving figures or real people, the 
authors still found activation of the right STS in individuals with schizophrenia during the 
processing of cartoons that included human figures.  This activation was comparable to 
healthy controls.  Thus, from this very limited evidence, it appears that individuals with 
schizophrenia may display intact STS functioning.  
Amygdala
Considerably more information is available on amygdala volume and functioning in 
schizophrenia.  Although initial reports of amygdala volume could not agree on a unilateral 
or bilateral reduction (see Buchanan et al., 1993 and Pearlson et al., 1997 for examples), 
more recent studies have supported a bilateral volume reduction (Joyal et al., 2003; Nelson, 
Saykin, Flashman, & Riordan, 1998; Niu et al., 2004).  Additionally, a meta-analysis by 
Wright et al. (2000) supports this conclusion by reporting that the average volume of the 
amygdala in an individual with schizophrenia is only 94% of that in a healthy individual.  It 
should be noted quickly however that despite these rather convincing results, some caution is 
warranted as a few studies have failed to find differences in amygdala volume between 
individuals with schizophrenia and control individuals (Sumich et al., 2002; Tanskanen et al., 
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2005).  Additionally, the findings of Sumich et al. also suggest that reductions in amygdala 
volume may not be consistent across symptom profiles or schizophrenia subtypes.  
Specifically, in this study, individuals with paranoid schizophrenia were found to have 
significantly smaller left amygdala volumes than non-paranoid individuals.  Thus, the exact 
nature of these volume reductions may be more subtle than originally thought.   
There is also evidence that amygdalar activation is abnormal in individuals with 
schizophrenia, particularly when negative affect is involved.  Schneider and colleagues 
(1998) used mood induction in both persons with schizophrenia and normal controls and 
showed that persons with schizophrenia had reduced amygdalar activation during sadness, 
despite self-ratings of sadness that were comparable to controls.  In addition, Taylor, 
Liberzon, Decker, and Koeppe (2002) found reduced activation of the amygdala in 
individuals with schizophrenia while viewing non-aversive, but emotionally salient stimuli, 
and Takahashi et al. (2004) found reduced activation of the right amygdala in individuals 
with schizophrenia as compared to controls while viewing emotionally unpleasant stimuli 
despite similar behavioral ratings of the photos.  Moreover, a study utilizing an emotion 
labeling task found significantly less activation of the amygdala bilaterally in individuals 
with schizophrenia as compared to control participants (Hempel et al., 2003), and a similar 
study found reduced activation of the left amygdala in patients while discriminating 
emotional valance (Gur et al., 2002; see Kosaka et al., 2002 for evidence of increased 
activation when identifying happiness).  
Finally, a few innovative studies have begun to examine whether amygdala activation 
may vary within schizophrenia sub-type.  One such study evaluated individuals with 
paranoid and non-paranoid schizophrenia during an emotion recognition task and showed 
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that relative to healthy control participants, both groups of individuals with schizophrenia 
were not only less accurate in identifying emotions, but they also displayed no amygdalar 
activation to fearful expressions (Phillips et al., 1999).  An elegant study combined fMRI and 
skin conductance arousal measures to further explore potential differences between paranoid 
and non-paranoid patients.  Via this methodology, Williams and colleagues (2004) found that 
individuals with paranoid schizophrenia reacted with greater levels of arousal to fearful faces 
than either controls or non-paranoid patients and that despite this increased arousal, these 
individuals showed reduced amygdala activity.  Interestingly, non-paranoid subjects did not 
differ from controls in level of amygdala activation.  Collectively, these studies and those 
reviewed earlier provide considerable evidence of reduced amygdala activity in 
schizophrenia although no definitive conclusions can yet be drawn concerning the 
consistency of this abnormality across schizophrenia sub-types.  
The FG, STS, and Amygdala in Autism
Fusiform Gyrus
Given the considerable evidence for face processing deficits in autism and the relative 
specificity of the FG, this neural structure became an early target for investigators.  Schultz 
and colleagues (2000) were among the first to compare FG activation in individuals with 
autism to typically developing individuals.  In this study, Schultz et al. first identified 
primary face and object processing areas in a sample of typically developing individuals and 
then compared these activation patterns to those present in individuals with autism.  Results 
indicated that as compared to controls, individuals with autism showed no activation of the 
FG but increased activation of those areas typically used for object processing, suggesting 
that individuals with autism may process faces not as socially relevant stimuli but as objects.  
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Several subsequent studies have complemented these findings by also reporting a lack of FG 
activation during face perception (Hubl et al., 2003; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & 
Courchesne, 2001), explicit processing of facial emotions (Critchley et al., 2000), and affect 
perception (Hall et al., 2003; Piggot et al., 2004).  
Although these results appear convincing, one important confound of these studies 
deserves note.  As mentioned previously, individuals with autism utilize abnormal viewing 
strategies when processing faces and spend less time viewing the core features of the face 
(Pelphrey et al., 2002).  These findings introduce the possibility that the lack of FG activation 
seen in these individuals may not be due to a dysfunctional FG per se, but rather a lack of 
attention to those stimuli that typically elicit FG activation.  To address this issue, Hadjikhani 
and colleagues (2004) controlled for visual focus by adding a fixation point to the center of 
their stimuli in order to ensure that all participants were attending to the same features.  They 
found that individuals with autism exhibited normal activation of the FG while viewing 
faces.  Despite this rather rudimentary control for visual focus, the results offered compelling 
evidence for potentially normal activation of the FG in autism.  These results were recently 
expanded upon in a noteworthy study that combined eye tracking and functional magnetic 
imaging techniques.  In this study, Dalton and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that activation 
in the fusiform gyrus of individuals with autism was positively correlated with the amount of 
time spent fixating on the eye region of faces, thus suggesting that the lack of activation 
found in previous studies could be due to abnormal face processing strategies rather than 
abnormal neural activation.  One additional study that warrants mention can be viewed as 
indirectly supporting the possibility that, under the right conditions, the FG is capable of 
activation in autism.  In this intriguing study, Grelotti et al. (2005) employed faces, objects, 
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and a visual stimulus in which a participant with autism had a special interest, namely 
“Digimon” cartoon characters.  By visually presenting these stimuli during functional 
neuroimaging, the authors demonstrated FG activation in response to Digimon stimuli but 
not to familiar or unfamiliar faces.  Here, FG activation required a stimulus in which the 
participant had a special interest, or expertise, but it is worthwhile to note that FG activation 
was achieved.  
Superior Temporal Sulcus
As with schizophrenia, there is a general lack of information addressing STS volume 
and functioning in autism, however, the information that is available does suggest both 
volumetric and functional abnormalities in autism.  First, a structural MRI study of children 
with autism revealed decreased volumes of grey matter in the STS as compared to typically 
developing children (Boddaert et al., 2004), and second, both functional imaging studies that 
examined the STS found reduced activation as compared to control participants (Castelli et 
al., 2002; Pierce et al., 2001).  In Castelli and colleagues, reduced activation was found in 
response to animations of geometrical shapes moving in socially relevant patterns, and Pierce 
et al. noted reduced activation during face perception.  
Amygdala
Reviews examining amygdala volume in autism provide mixed results with some 
studies showing increased volume as compared to controls whereas others show no 
differences or reductions in volume (see Brambilla et al., 2003 and Sweeten, Posey, Skekhar, 
& McDougle, 2002 for reviews).  Functional studies, on the other hand, present more 
consistent results.  In 1999, Baron-Cohen, Ring, and colleagues conducted functional brain 
scans while asking autistic and typically developing participants to complete his Eyes Task.  
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Analysis of this data revealed no activation of the amygdala in individuals with autism.  
Similarly, Pierce et al. (2001) failed to find amygdala activation in individuals with autism 
during a task of face processing, and Critchley, Daly, Phillips et al. (2000) reported a lack of 
activation of the left amygdala during implicit processing of facial expressions as compared 
to control participants.  Thus far, only one study has failed to find differences in amygdala 
activation in individuals with autism (Piggot et al., 2004), and although these results are not 
consistent with previous studies, it is possible that task demands and participant 
characteristics can account for the null finding.  Specifically, this study included only high-
functioning individuals with autism and asked them to process only basic emotions.  Given 
that high-functioning individuals often do not show impairments in identifying basic 
emotions, these results would be consistent with behavioral data.  Likewise, these results
pose interesting questions about variations in level of amygdala impairment across the autism 
spectrum and variations in amygdala functioning based on difficulty of social cognitive task.    
Integration
It is clear from the literature that there are striking similarities, both behaviorally and 
neurobiologically, between schizophrenia and autism.  Both groups appear to have similar 
social cognitive profiles with primary deficits in ToM and social perception, and in both 
groups, these deficits are related to functioning.  Most interestingly however, similar neural 
abnormalities are implicated as the underlying mechanisms of these deficits in both disorders 
(Figure 1).  Specifically, both groups display either reduced or no activation of the FG while 
viewing faces, and as noted previously, the FG has consistently been cited as integral to face 
perception and processing.  Thus, it is possible that abnormally low levels of FG activation in 
schizophrenia and autism may be partially responsible for deficits in social perception.  
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Although, as noted earlier, reduced FG activation in autism may be secondary to 
inappropriate selective attention.
Likewise, both groups show reduced, or absent, amygdala activation while processing 
emotion and making social judgments.  In schizophrenia, it is unclear whether reductions in 
activation are unilateral or bilateral, and it is also unclear whether amygdala activation may 
vary by schizophrenia subtype.  For autism, a lack of activation is apparent in both explicit 
and implicit processing of emotions, and the extent of the deficit remains unclear in that one 
study found intact activation during the processing of basic emotions (Piggot et al., 2004).  
Combining these literatures would suggest that individuals with schizophrenia should also 
show reduced amygdala activation during both explicit and implicit processing of social 
information and that across both groups, the degree of amygdala activation should negatively 
correlate with task complexity.  Therefore, when processing complex social stimuli, both 
groups should show reduced amygdala activation.  Moreover, this synthesis would also 
suggest that reduced amygdala activation in schizophrenia and autism should be reflected in 
abnormal behavioral performances on complex tasks of social perception.  If borne out, these 
speculations would not only clarify similarities between schizophrenia and autism, but could 
also provide compelling evidence for the hypothesis that neural abnormalities underlie, and 
are responsible for, deficits in social cognition.  Such conclusions would have a considerable 
impact on intervention techniques for both disorders and could potentially contribute to the 
development of interventions that target both behavioral and neural functioning. 
Unanswered Questions
Despite the numerous parallels between schizophrenia and autism, there is a general 
dearth of studies directly comparing social cognitive profiles or neural activation across the 
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two disorders.  Thus far, only three studies have directly compared the social cognitive 
abilities of individuals with schizophrenia to those of autism.  Pilowski et al., (2000) found 
that children with autism performed worse on a deception task than children with 
schizophrenia but that both clinical groups performed worse than controls on a false belief 
task.  Similarly, Craig et al. (2004) compared ToM abilities in adults with schizophrenia and 
autism.  Using both a hinting task and the Eyes Task, Craig et al. found comparable deficits 
in each group as compared to healthy controls.  Finally, Bolte and Poustka (2003) have been 
the only investigators to compare these groups on a measure of social perception.  In their 
study, only individuals with autism showed impaired performance on a test of facial affect 
recognition whereas control participants and individuals with schizophrenia did not differ 
from each other.  
Examined as a whole, these preliminary results suggest an intriguing pattern in which 
individuals with schizophrenia may outperform individuals with autism on tasks of basic 
social cognition (i.e. basic emotion perception) but perform similarly to individuals with 
autism on tasks that require higher levels of social cognitive skill (i.e. the Eyes Task).  This 
raises the interesting question of whether this behavioral pattern remains manifest across a 
different social perception task that requires complex social judgments (i.e. the 
Trustworthiness Task) and more importantly, whether these similarities would be reflected in 
comparable patterns of neural activation.  To our knowledge, no studies have used functional 
imaging to examine neural activation during the Trustworthiness Task in clinical populations, 
and no study has directly compared the neural profiles of schizophrenia and autism.  
Additionally, no studies have attempted to directly link activation of the amygdala to social 
behavior.  Therefore, through this dissertation, I hope to elucidate whether a shared neural 
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profile underlies social cognitive abnormalities in both disorders and to clarify the means by 
which two disorders with different developmental pathways can have similar social cognitive 
outcomes.  This information may not only shed light on the developmental neural 
mechanisms of social cognition, but also offers the opportunity to inform our understanding 
of abnormalities at the level of brain-behavior interactions in schizophrenia and autism.  
Thus, the specific hypotheses and goals of this study are as follows.  First, based on 
previous research, it is predicted that individuals with schizophrenia and individuals with 
autism will show reduced neural activation in key components of the “social brain” during 
complex social judgments as compared to healthy control participants.  Reductions in 
activation should be apparent for both individuals with autism and individuals with 
schizophrenia in the amygdala and the fusiform gyrus, and also in the superior temporal 
sulcus for individuals with autism only.  Additionally, the discrepancy between activation 
levels of the amygdala in the clinical groups and the healthy participants should be most 
pronounced when stimulus faces are perceived as untrustworthy.  
Next, in regard to behavioral performance on the Trustworthiness Task, two 
competing hypotheses will be tested.  First, the work of Adolphs and colleagues (2001) 
suggests that individuals with autism should rate more faces as trustworthy and that this 
should occur as a function of hypoactivtion of the amygdala. Work demonstrating 
hypoactivtion of the amygdala in schizophrenia also suggests that these individuals should 
rate more faces as trustworthy as compared to controls.  Thus, the first hypothesis predicts 
that both clinical groups will rate more faces than controls as trustworthy.  The competing 
hypothesis, however, considers the clinical characteristic that both disorders tend to show 
increased rates of paranoid ideation.  Paranoid ideation can be defined as “the belief that 
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someone, some organization, or some force or power is trying to harm oneself in some way” 
(Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974, p. 170).  Given this definition, it is likely that individuals 
with paranoia will perceive more stimuli as threatening or untrustworthy.  Therefore, the 
competing hypothesis predicts that both clinical groups should rate fewer faces as 
trustworthy due to increased paranoia.  
Further, in terms of behavior, it is expected that both individuals with autism and 
individuals with schizophrenia will show impairments in social functioning compared to 
healthy control participants; however, individuals with autism are expected to show the 
greatest impairment relative to both other groups.  Finally, it is anticipated that more 
normative activation of the amygdala will be related to better social functioning.  Given the 
lack of research addressing direct brain-behavior relationships with in the domain of social 
cognition, this last hypothesis should be viewed in an exploratory manner.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
Participants were individuals recruited from three groups: non-clinical control 
participants (n=12), individuals with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (SCZ: n=12), 
and individuals with high-functioning autism or Asperger’s disorder (HFA: n=12).  To be 
included in the study, all participants had to be male, between the ages of 18 and 35, be free 
of neurological impairment, have no metal in his body, be right-handed, have a visual acuity 
of at least 20/70, and could not meet current criteria for substance abuse or dependence.  
Non-clinical control participants were recruited via informational emails soliciting 
participation in research and from other research studies conducted in our lab.  All control 
participants were screened for personal and family history of psychopathology to ensure that 
they did not meet past or present criteria for schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or any 
autism spectrum disorder and that they did not have any first- degree relatives with a 
psychotic, affective, or developmental disorder.
Individuals in the schizophrenia group were recruited from the Schizophrenia 
Treatment and Evaluation Program (STEP) at the University of North Carolina 
Neurosciences Hospital and had a diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder 
based on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-P) and chart review.  
Additionally, given that individuals with HFA often report symptoms of paranoia (Hare 
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1997; Wing 1996), an attempt was made to recruit individuals who were actively 
experiencing symptoms of paranoia, so as to match the two clinical groups as closely as 
possible. 
Of the 12 participants in the SCZ group, 8 individuals had a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia and 4 of schizoaffective disorder.  Severity of symptoms was assessed with the 
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS: Kay, Opler, & Fiszbein, 1992), a semi-
structured clinical interview designed to measure the full range of psychotic 
symptomatology.  The PANSS was administered by research assistants who had been trained 
to adequate reliability (ICC of > .80 with a gold standard rater), and symptom severity was 
rated on a scale from 1 (absent) to 7 (extremely severe).  All participants were experiencing 
significant symptoms of paranoia at the time of testing, scoring at least a 4 or above on the 
suspiciousness/persecution item, and overall symptom totals were as follows: positive 
symptom total: M=18.08 (SD = 4.34); negative symptom total: M= 11.83 (SD = 6.16); and 
general symptom total: M=31.00 (SD = 6.55).  Additionally, at the time of testing, all 
individuals in this group had been adhering to a stable regimen of atypical antipsychotic 
medications for at least four weeks, and as based on Woods (2003), the mean 
Chlorpromazine equivalent dose was 404.86 mg/day (SD=249.2).  
Finally, individuals with autism spectrum disorders were recruited through the 
University of North Carolina STAART (Studies to Advance Autism Research and 
Treatment) Subject Registry Core and the TEACCH (Treatment and Education of Autistic 
and Related Communication Handicapped Children) programs in Chapel Hill and Asheville, 
North Carolina.  All diagnoses were confirmed with the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & LeCouteur, 1994) and/or the Autism Diagnostic 
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Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 1999) or chart review.  
Chi-square tests and a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) were conducted 
on the demographic variables (see Table 1 for demographic information).  No differences 
existed between the three groups on ethnicity (2=2.4, p=.663) or marital status (2=.3.6, 
p=.165); however, the groups did significantly differ on the combined variables of age and 
years of education (Wilks’ =.587, F(4, 64)=4.886, p=.002).  Univariate analyses revealed 
that the multivariate effect was driven by a significant difference between the groups in years 
of education (F(2, 33)=10.118, p<.001) but that the groups did not significantly differ on age 
(F(2, 33)=1.174, p=.322).  Overall, the control group had completed more years of education 
than both the SCZ and HFA comparison groups (p<.001 and p=.001, respectively) who did 
not differ from one another (p=.819).    
Imaging Stimuli and fMRI Experiment
To examine neural activation, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was 
utilized while individuals completed the abbreviated Trustworthiness/Approachability Task 
(Adolphs et al., 1998).  In this task, individuals were asked to view 42 grayscale frontal 
images of faces and to make a dichotomous decision regarding the trustworthiness of the 
individual in each photo.  It should be noted that the original version of this task requires 
participants to rate each face on a Likert scale from -3 (not at all trustworthy) to +3 (very 
trustworthy); however, in order to integrate this task with an imaging paradigm, the rating 
scale was replaced with a forced choice of trustworthiness.  Thus, participants rated each face 
as either trustworthy or untrustworthy.  This procedure was based on Winston et al. (2000).  
Participants responded by pushing a button corresponding to their rating, and these 
determinations, as well as reaction time, were recorded and used as a behavioral index of 
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performance on this task.  
In further adapting this task to an imaging paradigm, it was divided into two 
functional runs, each containing 21 photographs, in which each photograph was displayed for 
2 seconds with 16 seconds between each face presentation.  While not viewing a face, 
participants were instructed to keep their eyes focused on a white fixation cross that was 
presented in the middle of the viewing area.  This was done in order to control for visual 
fixation during the task.  
Following the Trustworthiness/Approachability Task, individuals participated in a 
localizer session designed to isolate the face responsive region of the fusiform gyrus, or 
fusiform face area.  In this task, individuals passively viewed series of grayscale photos of 
either faces or tools that were presented in six 30 second blocks with a 20 second interval 
between blocks.  Stimulus epochs alternated between the two different conditions (i.e. faces 
only vs. tools only) and began with a block of face stimuli.  During each stimulus epoch, 45 
different photos were presented at the rate of one every 670 msec (with the stimulus on for 
500 msec and off for 170 msec).  Between stimulus block presentations, participants were 
asked to focus their gaze on a fixation cross to control for visual fixation, and this task was 
completed in one functional run.  This procedure is based on that of Kanwisher, McDermott, 
& Chun (1997).
Behavioral Tasks/Measures
As noted above, behavioral data was collected during the imaging session in order to 
assess group differences in social perception.  In addition, following the scanning session, all 
participants were asked to complete several behavioral measures and tasks designed to assess 
cognitive abilities, symptomatology, and social functioning.  Social functioning measures 
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were used to explore potential impairments in both clinical groups and to explore 
relationships between neural activation and functioning.  Finally, tasks assessing cognitive 
abilities and symptomatology were utilized to assess “third variable” factors that may have 
influence performance and contributed to group differences on the social perception and 
social functioning measures.  
Cognitive Assessments
General cognitive ability was assessed with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI).  This measure provides an estimate of full-scale IQ as well as estimates 
of verbal and performance IQs.  Additionally, an assessment of reading ability was obtained 
with the reading scale of the Wide Range Achievement Test-III (WRAT-III; Wilkinson, 
1993).  Previous research has demonstrated that reading ability can be considered a gross 
estimate of premorbid IQ (Dalby & Williams, 1986; Griffin, Rivera-Mindt, Rankin, Ritchie, 
& Scott, 2002; Johnstone & Wilhelm, 1996), and thus, the use of this measure allows a 
comparison of intellectual functioning between groups somewhat independently of clinical 
status.    
Symptomatology
Individuals in all groups were asked to complete the Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992).  The PS is comprised of 20 self-report items designed to assess subclinical 
paranoid thought and that specifically measures self-consciousness and self-attention.  Each 
item is rated on a Likert scale from 1-5, (1 = Not at all applicable; 5 = extremely applicable), 
and performance is indexed as the total score, with higher scores indicating higher levels of 
paranoia.  The PS has good internal consistency and reliability, =.84 and .70 respectively, 
and has been shown to be sensitive to subclinical levels of paranoia in normal populations 
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(Combs & Penn, 2004) and to correlate well with clinical ratings of paranoia in psychotic 
populations (Smari, Stefansson, & Thorgilsson, 1994).
Social Functioning
Social functioning was assessed with the Social Functioning Scale (SFS; Birchwood, 
Smith, Cochrane, Wetton, & Copestake, 1990).  The SFS assesses strengths and weaknesses 
in seven areas of functioning: social engagement, interpersonal communication, pro-social 
activities, recreation, independence-competence, independence-performance, and 
employment/occupation.  Responses in each section are scored from 3-0, 3 being the highest 
social functioning rating and 0 being the lowest.  Performance is indexed as the percentage 
achieved of the maximum possible score on each subscale such that higher percentages 
indicate better social functioning.   
Image Acquisition
For the Trustworthiness/Approachability Task, a slow event-related design with a 16 
second inter-stimulus interval was utilized.  This design allowed the hemodynamic response 
to return to baseline following each stimulus presentation and allowed the response to each 
stimulus to be examined as an individual event.  Additionally, as mentioned above, a block 
design incorporating 30 second stimulus epochs interleaved with seven 20 second epochs of 
fixation was utilized for the localizer task.  All functional data was collected using a Siemens 
Allegra 3T MRI scanner to acquire echo planar T2* weighted images with BOLD (blood 
oxygenation level dependent) contrast (EPI free induction decay, 2D; 32 slices, voxel size 
3.8x3.8x3.8 mm, matrix=64x64; FOV=243x243, TR=2 sec, TE=30ms, Flip angle = 80).  In 
each of the first two functional runs comprising the Trustworthiness Task, 194 images were 
collected using an interleaved acquisition sequence resulting in a total acquisition time of 398 
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seconds per run.  During the localizer task, 165 images were collected with an interleaved 
sequence resulting in a total acquisition time of 324 seconds.  Each functional run was 
preceded by two volumes that were discarded to allow for equilibration effects.  Following 
the three functional runs, a structural scan sequence (MPRAGE) was also conducted to 
obtain a T1 weighted anatomical image (128 slices, voxel size 1x1x1 mm, matrix=256x256, 
FOV=208x256, TR=1520 ms, TE=4.38 ms) for co-registration and display of functional data.   
The acquisition time for this scan was 318 seconds.  Throughout all MRI data collection, 
cushioned head restraints were used to control for movement.    
Spatial Preprocessing
All images were spatially preprocessed using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology, Queen Square, London, United Kingdom).  Data was first corrected for 
slice-acquisition time and motion.  Images were then normalized to an EPI template 
corresponding to standard MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space and smoothed using 
an 8-mm FWHM (full width at half maximum) Gaussian kernel.  In-plane anatomical images 
were then co-registered to the functional images.  
Data Analysis
As the hypotheses of this study included both neural and behavioral outcomes, it 
should be clarified that imaging data were utilized to test the first hypothesis which stated 
that HFA individuals would show reduced neural activation in the amygdala, FFA, and STS
compared to controls, and that SCZ individuals would show reduced activation in the 
amygdala and FFA compared to controls.  Behavioral data were used for the second 
hypothesis predicting that both clinical groups would differ from controls on the 
Trustworthiness task and show significant impairments in social functioning as compared to 
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controls.  And finally, a combination of behavioral and imaging data was used to test the last, 
and exploratory, area of interest concerning the relationship between amygdala activation and 
social functioning.   
Imaging Data
In testing the hypothesis that both individuals with schizophrenia and individuals with 
autism would show reduced neural activation during the Trustworthiness Task, region of 
interest analyses were conducted using a combination of SPM2 and the WFU Pick Atlas 
(Maldjian, Laurienti, Burdette, & Kraft, 2003).   First, for each subject, statistical contrast 
maps using a hemodynamic response function with the temporal derivative were generated 
for each within-subject comparison of interest.  Contrasts were designed specifically to 
examine differences in neural activation in response to faces rated as trustworthy and those 
rated as untrustworthy as well as to examine overall activation during the process of making 
a complex social judgment regardless of outcome.  Consistent effects in regions of interest 
across subjects within each group were then tested by including these contrast images in a 
one-sample t-test.  Statistical threshold was set at p<.05, corrected for multiple comparisons 
across a small volume of interest (FWE), using ROIs derived as detailed below.  
To examine between-group differences, two sample t-tests (conforming to random 
effects analyses) were then conducted for each combination of group comparison.  These 
tests were performed by using the contrast images of individual subjects as input.  Regions of 
interest (ROI) for the amygdala, STS, and FG, were then defined as detailed below, and ROI 
analyses were conducted using the WFU Pick Atlas.  Significant clusters of activation within 
each ROI were identified based on a statistical threshold of p<.01 (uncorrected) and an extent 
threshold of 5 contiguous voxels.  
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Masks Defining Regions of Interest
Regions of interest for the right and left amygdala were defined by drawing a mask 
around the regions bilaterally using the software package MRIcro (Rorden & Brett, 2000) on 
a mean anatomical image created by averaging the T1 anatomical images of all participants 
in the study.  Total volume of the amygdala ROI was approximately 12 cm3.  A region of 
interest for the STS was defined using statistical results from a one sample t-test of activation 
during trust judgments using all 36 participants (p<.05 FWE corrected).  These results 
yielded a significant cluster of 28 voxels (local maxima: x,y,z = 45, -33,-12) that 
corresponded with the right posterior STS and that was subsequently used as the mask for 
this ROI.  Finally, a region of interest for the FFA was defined by use of the localizer task 
detailed previously.  Here again, data were combined across all subjects, and significant 
activations from a faces > tools contrast (p<.001 uncorrected) were examined.  Results 
produced a significant cluster of 10 voxels (local maxima: x,y,z=45, -51, -27) within the right 
fusiform gyrus that is consistent with other reported locations of the FFA (Kanwisher et al., 
1997; Winston et al., 2002).  As in Winston et al. (2002), this cluster was combined with a 
sphere of 10 mm radius centered on the local maxima to create a complete ROI for the FFA.
It should also be noted that an ROI corresponding to bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (VLPFC) was added as a post hoc area of interest.  This region has not traditionally 
been considered part of the social cognitive network; however, recent work has demonstrated 
that the VLPFC modulates activation of the amygdala such that activity in this region tends 
to correlate negatively with amygdala activation (Cunningham et al., 2004; Hariri et al., 
2000; Hariri, Mattay, Tessitore, Fera, & Weinberger, 2003), and this is particularly true 
during the process of making evaluative judgments (Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore & 
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Banaji, 2003).  Thus, examination of this area may help clarify findings regarding differences 
in amygdala activation.  The ROI for this region was defined via the statistical results for the 
one sample t-test across all 36 participants.  These results yielded two local maxima (right 
x,y,z= 45, 15, -12 and left x,y,z= -39, 21, -9) corresponding to right and left VLPFC that were 
combined with spheres of 15 mm radius centered at each local maxima.   
Supplemental Analysis of ROI Time Courses
To augment the analyses described above, the mean response over time of each group 
within each ROI was extracted using the software package MarsBaR (Brett, Anton, 
Valabregue, & Poline, 2002).  Here, the response for each type of event (i.e. trustworthy 
faces and untrustworthy faces) was derived via a finite impulse response (FIR) model with 2 
second time bins.  Where appropriate, time points at the peak of each time course were then 
statistically tested using paired-sample t-tests and repeated measures ANOVAs with event 
type as the repeated measure and group membership as the between subjects factor.  
Behavioral Data
To test the hypothesis that individuals in both clinical groups would rate faces 
differently from controls and show lower levels of social functioning, group differences on 
the number of faces rated as trustworthy during the imaging session were examined with a 
one-way (Group: control vs. HFA vs. SCZ) ANOVA with Tukey’s LSD post hoc tests, and 
differences in performance on the combined SFS subscales were assessed with a one-way 
(Group: control vs. HFA vs. SCZ) Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with post 
hoc tests.  Group differences in cognitive abilities and paranoia were also assessed, and the 
primary analyses were repeated while covarying for significant group differences on these 
and demographic factors.        
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Finally, to address the exploratory goal of examining the relationship between neural 
activation and social functioning, bivariate correlations were conducted between the overall 
degree of amygdala activation and scores on the SFS subscales for each participant.  To do 
so, degree of amygdala activation was established in two primary ways.  One, the spatial 
extent of activation (i.e. the number of active voxels) within the amygdala ROI for each 
participant was recorded and used as the first index of amygdala activation.  Two, the peak 
response of the amygdala time course, which represents the greatest amount of percent signal 
change within the ROI, was selected and recorded as the second index of amygdala 
activation.  These indices were then correlated with performance on the SFS.  One tailed tests 
were utilized given the expectation of a positive association between amygdala activation and 
social functioning.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Imaging Data
To evaluate the first hypothesis that individuals in both clinical groups would show 
reduced neural activation compared to controls, both within- and between-group comparisons 
were conducted using the imaging data.  Within-group comparisons were used to verify that 
the Trustworthiness task resulted in activation of the targeted ROIs and to examine 
differences in neural responses to faces that were rated as untrustworthy compared to faces 
rated as trustworthy.  Between-group comparisons were used to directly test differences in 
neural activation between the control and clinical groups.  
Within-group Comparisons
As expected, completion of the Trustworthiness Task resulted in significant activation 
in each of the key structures implicated in social perception.  Averaged contrasts for the 
overall effect of completing the Trustworthiness Task, regardless of how a face was rated, 
revealed that each group showed significant activation within each ROI.  That is, all three 
groups showed significant activation of bilateral amygdala, bilateral VLPFC, right STS, and 
right FFA (p<.05, FWE corrected for comparisons across a small volume of interest; Table 
2).  
To explore the main effect of trustworthiness rating, averaged contrasts were created 
for each group for faces that were judged to be untrustworthy relative to those rated as 
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trustworthy.  In this contrast, control participants showed significantly increased BOLD 
responses in bilateral VLPFC (right, 51, 27, -9; Z=3.77; left, -45, 21, -6; Z=5.39; both p<.05 
FWE small volume corrected) and right STS (51, -33, -9; Z=3.59; p<.05 FWE small volume 
corrected) indicating that greater responses in these areas were associated with faces judged 
as untrustworthy.  These findings were confirmed via statistical examination of the time 
courses extracted from each ROI (Figure 2).  Activation in the right amygdala and right FFA 
was also evident in the contrast of untrustworthy to trustworthy faces (AMY, 18, -6, -27; 
Z=2.69; FFA, 51, -48, -24; Z=2.65); however, these clusters did not survive correction for 
multiple comparisons.
A different pattern emerged for the two clinical groups on this contrast.  For both the 
HFA and SCZ groups, significant levels of activation were not evident in any regions of 
interest indicating a lack of greater activation in these areas for untrustworthy faces.  To rule 
out the possibility that these regions showed greater activation when a face was rated to be 
trustworthy as compared to untrustworthy, a trustworthy > untrustworthy contrast was also 
examined.  Again, no significant activations were evident in any region of interest for either 
the HFA or SCZ group.
Between-group Comparisons
To explore the main effect of group and test the hypothesis that the clinical groups 
would show reduced neural activation as compared to controls, two-sample t-tests were 
conducted for each combination of group comparisons across overall activation in response 
to the Trustworthiness Task.  Examination of the control group relative to the HFA group 
revealed significantly greater activation for controls in right amygdala, left VLPFC, and FFA 
(Figure 3).  No group differences in STS activation were apparent, and no significantly 
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greater activation was identified for the HFA group as compared to controls.  For the 
comparison between the control group and this SCZ group, a similar pattern emerged.  
Control participants showed significantly greater activation than individuals with 
schizophrenia in right amygdala, left VLPFC, and FFA, and again no differences were 
apparent in the STS (Figure 3).  Likewise, the SCZ group failed to show greater activation 
than controls in any regions of interest.  Finally, the direct comparison of the HFA and SCZ 
participants across the defined ROIs yielded no significant differences in activation between 
these two groups.  
The interaction between group and trustworthiness rating was tested by comparing 
groups on the untrustworthy faces > trustworthy faces contrast.  These comparisons revealed 
that when a face was rated as untrustworthy, controls showed significantly greater activation 
than both clinical groups in bilateral VLPFC (Figure 4).  This discrepancy was most 
pronounced in the comparison between the control group and the SCZ group.  No other areas 
of interest were differentially active in these comparisons.   
All imaging results were confirmed via repeated measures ANOVAs on peak time 
course data extracted from each ROI with trust rating (untrustworthy vs. trustworthy) as the 
within-subjects factor and group (control vs. HFA vs. SCZ) as the between-subjects factor 
(Figure 5).  Main effects for group were probed with Tukey’s LSD post hoc tests.  
Examination of the time course data from the amygdala revealed a significant main effect for 
group (F(2, 33)=4.420, p=.02) such that the control group showed a greater response across 
all faces as compared to both the HFA group and the SCZ group (p=.011 and p=.02, 
respectively) and that the HFA and SCZ group did not differ from one another (p=.810).  
Further, within the amygdala, there was no main effect for trustworthiness ratings (F(2, 
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33)=.235, p=.631), nor was there a significant interaction between trust rating and group 
(F(2, 33)=.836, p=.442).  Similarly, time course data extracted from the FFA demonstrated a 
significant main effect for group (F(2, 33)=3.906, p=.03).  Post hoc tests clarified that the 
control group showed significantly more activation in this region than either of the clinical 
groups (HFA: p=.018 and SCZ: p =.026) and that the clinical groups did not differ from each 
other (p=.877).  Both the main effect for trustworthiness ratings (F(2, 33)=3.590, p=.067) and 
the interaction (F(2, 33)=3.105, p=.058) approached significance.  Examination of the 
interaction revealed that only the control group showed greater activation within the FFA 
when a face was judged to be untrustworthy.  It is important to note, however, that these 
results were not echoed in the SPM analyses and should therefore be interpreted cautiously.  
Finally, within the VLPFC, a significant group by trustworthiness rating interaction indicated 
that the control group showed greater activation of this region than the clinical groups when a 
face was rated as untrustworthy (F(2, 33)=7.159, p=.003). 
Behavioral Data
Behavioral Data during Scanning: Trustworthiness Task
Next, to examine the hypothesis that the control and clinical groups would differ in 
trustworthiness ratings, a one-way (group: control vs. HFA vs. SCZ) ANOVA conducted on 
the total number of faces judged as trustworthy on the Trustworthiness Task approached 
statistical significance (F(2, 33)=3.116, p=.058).  Exploratory post hoc tests revealed a 
significant difference between the control group and the SCZ group (p=.018) indicating that 
the SCZ group rated significantly fewer faces as trustworthy.  No other post hoc tests were 
statistically significant.  Additionally, a one-way (group: control vs. HFA vs. SCZ) ANOVA 
conducted on reaction time was not significant (F(2, 33)=1.846, p=.174) revealing that the 
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groups did not differ in the length of time taken to judge each photo as trustworthy or 
untrustworthy (Table 3).  
Social Functioning
For social functioning, a one-way (group: control vs. HFA vs. SCZ) MANOVA on 
the SFS subscales was significant (Wilk’s =.309, F(14,54)=4.475, p=.001) indicating that 
the groups differed significantly on overall social functioning (Table 3).  Further, significant 
univariate group differences were observed on all subscales except for Recreation 
(F(2,33)=3.243, p=.052).  Non-clinical control participants performed better than both 
individuals with HFA and individuals with SCZ on the Social Engagement (F(2,33)=9.136, 
p=.001), Interpersonal Communication (F(2,33)=7.238, p=.002), and Pro-social Activities 
scales (F(2,33)=6.425, p=.004).  Additionally, on both Independence Performance 
(F(2,33)=4.450, p=.019) and Independence Competence (F(2,33)=4.354, p=.021), control 
participants scored higher than HFA individuals and comparably to SCZ individuals.  On 
these subscales, the HFA and SCZ groups did not differ.  Finally, on the Employment 
subscale, the control and HFA groups scored similarly, and both groups scored significantly 
higher than the SCZ group (F(2,33)=8.299, p=.001). 
Cognitive Functioning and Symptomatology
Finally, to rule out the potential effects of “third variables,” group differences in 
cognitive ability and paranoia were assessed, and the analyses for the SFS were repeated 
while controlling for demographic, symptom, and cognitive factors that significantly differed 
between groups.  A one-way (group: control vs. HFA vs. SCZ) MANOVA conducted on the 
combined cognitive variables of full scale IQ from the WASI and reading ability from the 
WRAT-III was significant (Wilk’s =.597, F(4, 64)=4.712, p=.002).   Univariate and post 
56
hoc analyses revealed that the multivariate effect was driven by significant differences 
between all groups on full scale IQ (F(2, 33)=10.81, p<.001) such that non-clinical control 
participants had the highest score followed by HFA participants and then SCZ participants.  
The univariate effect for the WRAT-III was not significant (F(2,33)=1.785, p=.184) 
indicating that the three groups did not significantly differ in reading ability.  
In regard to degree of paranoid ideation, a one-way (group: control vs. HFA vs. SCZ) 
ANOVA was also significant (F(2, 31)=4.725, p=.016).  Post hoc tests indicated that the 
control group endorsed significantly fewer paranoid statements than both the HFA and SCZ 
groups (p=.011 for both comparisons) who did not significantly differ from one another 
(p=.982).  Means for these comparisons are provided in Table 3.
The MANOVA on the SFS was repeated while covarying for the effects of education, 
WASI full scale IQ, and degree of paranoia.  The resulting multivariate effect remained 
statistically significant (Wilk’s =.343, F(14,44)=2.224, p=.022).  Given the absence of 
group differences on the Trustworthiness Task, these analyses were not repeated.  
Correlational Analyses: BOLD Signal Change and Social Functioning
To examine the exploratory hypothesis that level of amygdala activation would be 
positively related to social functioning, one-tailed bivariate correlations across all subjects 
were conducted between the subscales of the SFS and the number of active voxels in the 
amygdala ROI and the peak response of the amygdala time course (Table 4). All correlations 
were in the positive direction; however none reached significance at the Bonferroni corrected 
level of p.0035.  For descriptive purposes, correlations that were significant at the 
uncorrected level of p.05 (one-tailed) are detailed below.  
Activation of a greater number of voxels within the amygdala was significantly 
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associated with increased ability to live independently.  Additionally, performance on the 
Independence Competence subscale was also significantly correlated with the degree of 
amygdala activation as measured by height of the time course peak.  Finally, higher scores on 
the social engagement subscale were also related to a higher peak of activation within the 
amygdala, as were better performances on the Independence Performance and Employment 
subscales.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The primary goal of this study was to compare individuals with high-functioning 
autism to individuals with schizophrenia at both neural and behavioral levels as they 
completed a social cognitive task requiring complex social judgments.  It was hypothesized 
that both clinical groups would show reduced activation of the amygdala and fusiform face 
area, that only the HFA group would show reduced activation of the STS, and that both 
clinical groups would show abnormal performance on the social cognitive task.  To test these 
predictions, fMRI was utilized to assess neural activation as individuals completed the 
Trustworthiness Task.  Results largely confirmed the main study hypothesis: Individuals in 
both clinical groups showed significant reductions in activation of the amygdala, fusiform 
face area, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex compared to control participants.  Contrary to 
prediction, behavioral performance on the Trustworthiness task significantly differed only 
between control individuals and individuals with schizophrenia.  I also explored the link 
between amygdala functioning to social behavior.  Positive relationships were found between 
increased amygdala functioning and the ability to live independently, maintain employment, 
and interact with others.  These findings are discussed in detail below.  
To begin, a generalized inspection of the (within subject) imaging data revealed that 
all groups showed significant activation of the amygdala, STS, FFA, and VLPFC while 
completing the Trustworthiness task.  These findings are consistent with the neurobiological 
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model put forth by Brothers (1990) and lend support to models proposing well-defined neural 
substrates of social cognition.  The idea of a specified neural system that is devoted to the 
processing of social stimuli is further bolstered by the fact that the same structures were 
implicated in both non-clinical and clinical groups.  In addition, contrary to reports 
demonstrating a lack of neural activation in the amygdala and FFA in schizophrenia and 
autism (i.e. Phillips et al., 1999 for schizophrenia and Baron-Cohen, Ring et al., 1999; Pierce 
et al., 2001; Schultz et al., 2000 for autism), these findings indicate that clinical groups do 
show activation of these areas and that group differences are a matter of degree rather than a 
strict absence of activation.   
Within-subject comparisons of the imaging data also partially replicate the work of 
Winston and colleagues (2002) by elucidating differences in neural response associated with 
perceptions of trustworthiness from faces.  Specifically, Winston et al. found that when 
healthy individuals rated a face as untrustworthy, both the amygdala and STS showed 
significantly more activation than when a face was rated as trustworthy.  As in Winston et al., 
this study also found increased activation of the STS in non-clinical controls for faces that 
were rated as untrustworthy; however in contrast, only trend levels of greater amygdala 
activation for untrustworthy faces were evident.  Differential activation of the STS, an area 
typically implicated in the perception of biological motion, may be somewhat surprising, 
although, as Winston and colleagues point out, the STS has also been linked to theory of 
mind inferences.  Given that one may attempt to infer the intentions of another as a means of 
evaluating whether they can be trusted, and that uncertainty about these intentions may lead 
to a judgment of untrustworthiness, such a process may explain the differential activation 
seen here.  
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Methodological differences between this study and Winston et al. may help explain 
the slight discrepancy between findings regarding amygdala activation.  First, this study 
utilized a longer stimulus presentation and inter-stimulus interval than Winston and 
colleagues.  Recall that the amygdala appears to be maximally engaged in automatic and 
rapid processing.  Therefore, the greater processing time in the present study may not have 
optimally engaged the amygdala.  And second, this study utilized fewer events than Winston 
et al. and therefore may have had less power to detect differential activation within the 
amygdala (although the findings were in the expected direction and the results approached 
statistical significance). 
Findings from this study also extend those of Winston et al. (2002) by demonstrating 
increased activation of the VLPFC in non-clinical controls for untrustworthy faces.  This 
finding suggests that this region is sensitive to differing levels of perceived threat.  In 
addition, greater activation of the VLPFC during untrustworthiness judgments is consistent 
with work demonstrating that this area modulates and regulates emotional responses 
(Cunningham et al., 2004; Hariri et al., 2000).  Differential activation of the VLPFC is also 
particularly interesting in light of the trend levels of significantly greater activation of the 
amygdala in response to untrustworthy faces.  Overall, these findings suggest that in controls, 
untrustworthy faces may initially evoke a relatively more intense emotional response, but 
that this response is later attenuated by activation in the VLPFC.  Such an interpretation is 
also consistent with work showing that extended cognitive evaluation of emotional stimuli is 
associated with relative decreases in amygdala response and correlated increases in VLPFC 
activation, as compared to brief stimulus presentations (Cunningham et al., 2004; Hariri et 
al., 2003). 
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In contrast to the pattern of differential activation that was seen in non-clinical 
controls, there were no differences in neural activation within the examined ROIs for 
untrustworthy vs. trustworthy faces in either individuals with HFA or individuals with 
schizophrenia.  This lack of differentiation at the neural level suggests that the clinical groups 
were treating faces the same, irrespective of whether trustworthy or untrustworthy judgments 
are made.  This may be explained by the fact that the amygdala, in addition to its role in 
social cognition, has also been linked to associating stimuli with social and emotional value 
(reviewed in Adolphs, 1999b; Adolphs, 2001).   It is therefore possible that individuals with 
HFA and those with schizophrenia failed to assign emotional significance to these stimuli, 
resulting in a failure to show an accompanying affective response associated with greater 
neural, and in particular amygdala, activation for untrustworthy faces. This interpretation 
suggests that individuals with schizophrenia and autism do not process social stimuli in the 
same manner as controls.  
The foregoing within-group analyses were followed by examination of the primary 
hypothesis, which was confirmed: Both clinical groups showed significant reductions in 
neural activation while making complex social judgments compared to non-clinical controls.  
Significant reductions for both clinical groups were evident in the right amygdala and FFA 
and left VLPFC.  Reduced activation in the amygdala and FFA is consistent with several 
reported studies that investigated these disorders independently.  For instance, within 
schizophrenia research, numerous studies have demonstrated reductions in amygdala 
activation while processing emotional stimuli (i.e. Gur et al., 2002; Hempel et al., 2003; 
Taylor et al., 2002), and both Streit et al (2001) and Quintana et al. (2003) found reduced 
activation of the FFA in schizophrenia during emotion perception.  Similarly, the HFA 
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results are consistent with several studies that suggest dysfunction of the amygdala (Critchley 
et al., 2000; Pierce et al., 2001) and the FFA (Hall et al., 2003; Piggot et al., 2004) in this 
population.  Moreover, to date, this is the first study that has specifically examined the 
VLPFC in schizophrenia and autism.  Thus, the findings regarding the VLPFC expand upon 
the current body of research by demonstrating abnormal functioning of a neural region that 
has been linked to evaluative judgments of social stimuli.  These results also extend the 
current literature by demonstrating reduced activation of the amygdala and FFA in autism 
and schizophrenia during a task of complex social perception, and by the finding that this 
neural pattern does not differ between the two clinical groups. 
Contrary to the prediction that only individuals with HFA would show reduced 
activation in the STS, all groups showed comparable levels of neural activation in this region.  
This finding is consistent with previous research showing intact functioning of the STS in 
schizophrenia during a ToM task (Brunet et al., 2003) but contradicts the work of Pierce and 
colleagues (2001) who found reduced STS activation in autism while viewing faces.  The 
discrepancy between the results of this study and Pierce et al. may be explained by 
considering that only high-functioning individuals with autism were included in this study 
whereas Pierce et al. (2001) included only lower functioning individuals with autism and that 
Pierce et al. failed to control for visual fixation.  Such an explanation is consistent with work 
showing that individuals with HFA may achieve normative neural activation under certain 
experimental circumstances such as performing a basic social cognitive task (Piggot et al., 
2004) or manipulating visual focus (Hadjikhani et al., 2004).  It should also be noted that 
only very limited research has been dedicated to understanding STS functioning in autism 
and schizophrenia and that there is a lack of general knowledge concerning how this region 
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functions in clinical samples. The results reported here, therefore, are in need of replication.
Group comparisons also showed that the VLPFC had an increased response to 
untrustworthy faces for controls only.  Whereas the group differences detailed above are 
quantitative, that is, a matter of degree of activation, this finding highlights a qualitative 
difference in neural response between control and clinical groups.  Specifically, controls 
showed a pattern of responding that was consistent with a heightened perception of threat 
that was then modulated by prefrontal regions, a pattern not demonstrated by the two clinical 
groups.  Such a finding demonstrates that abnormalities in neural functioning go beyond 
simple comparisons of amount of activation and that future studies should also aim to 
examine more subtle and complex differences in patterns of neural functioning.  
The behavioral results of this study also offer interesting insights into the comparison 
of schizophrenia and autism.  First, it is interesting to note that both clinical groups showed 
significantly greater levels of paranoia than controls, and in fact, each scored almost 
identically on the paranoia scale.  This finding is consistent with clinical reports of paranoid 
ideation in HFA and supports empirical studies showing heightened paranoia in individuals 
with Asperger’s syndrome (Blackshaw et al., 2001; Craig et al., 2004).  Furthermore, these 
results extend previous work by calling attention to an understudied similarity between the 
disorders.  
Second, the hypothesis that both clinical groups would perform differently from 
controls on the Trustworthiness Task was only partially supported.  While both clinical 
groups rated more faces than controls as untrustworthy, only the difference between the SCZ 
group and control group was statistically significant.  The finding that both clinical groups 
rated faces more negatively than controls is consistent with the hypothesis that increased 
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paranoia is related to an increased tendency to rate more faces as untrustworthy.  This 
finding, however, is in direct contrast to both previous work using the Trustworthiness task 
with autism (Adolphs, Sears, et al., 2001) and the expected behavioral pattern associated with 
reduced amygdala activation.  Previous lesion and imaging studies suggest that a reduction in 
amygdala functioning is associated with increased ratings of trustworthiness; but here, the 
pattern of findings is reversed.  Thus, the counterintuitive finding of reduced amygdala 
activation with increased ratings of untrustworthiness suggests that in order to complete the 
Trustworthiness task, the clinical groups may have employed some compensatory 
mechanism(s) that were not assessed in this study.  
Third, as hypothesized, individuals with autism and individuals with schizophrenia 
demonstrated impairments in social functioning as compared to healthy controls.  Of 
particular interest is that individuals with HFA and individuals with schizophrenia were 
comparably impaired on subscales of the SFS directly assessing social skill and social 
involvement (i.e. social engagement, interpersonal communication, and pro-social activities).  
This finding underscores a key similarity between these disorders and emphasizes the 
centrality of social interaction impairments in both disorders.  In contrast, more variability 
was evident on subscales that addressed independent living and employment.  On scales 
assessing independent living, individuals with HFA showed the greatest degree of 
impairment among the groups, a finding that is consistent with the protracted developmental 
course of autism that can delay learning and attainment of functional living skills.  
Interestingly however, both controls and individuals with HFA scored significantly higher on 
the employment subscale than individuals with schizophrenia.  This finding may be 
explained by several factors including the recurrent and persistent nature of schizophrenia 
65
symptoms that often render individuals unable to maintain steady employment, the fact that 
several individuals with schizophrenia receive disability benefits and therefore do not work, 
or that this study utilized a sample of high-functioning individuals with autism, many of 
whom were in school or received supportive employment services through TEACCH.  Taken 
together, these findings are in accord with conceptualizations that social dysfunction is core 
feature of both disorders and again highlights comparable levels of impairment between 
schizophrenia and autism.  
Finally, this study attempted to elucidate brain-behavior relationships by directly 
linking neural activation of the amygdala to social functioning.  Although no correlations 
remained statistically significant after applying Bonferroni correction, uncorrected results do 
provide tentative support for a relationship between increased amygdala functioning and 
independent living abilities; however, any direct link to behavior should be interpreted 
cautiously.  It is possible that the lack of a strong relationship between the amygdala and 
behavior could be due to the amygdala’s primary role as a perceptual brain structure.  That is, 
the amygdala is most often implicated in social perception which suggests that this area is 
utilized early in the process of perceiving and reacting to social stimuli.  This suggests that 
association areas that interpret perceptual information (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex) may provide 
a better basis for assessing brain-behavior relationships.  Thus, additional brain regions both 
within the social cognitive network (i.e. the medial prefrontal cortex) and beyond the social 
cognitive network (i.e. the frontal cortices) that integrate social information might show more 
consistent relationships with social functioning.  Future work should develop methodologies 
that can better assess the complex relationships between neural and behavioral functioning 
and should continue to explore these relationships in both clinical and non-clinical samples.  
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Overall, the results provide evidence for considerable overlap between schizophrenia 
and autism that spans the domains of neural functioning, social cognition, social functioning, 
and symptoms.  As mentioned previously, this study is the first to directly compare these two 
disorders on neural activation, and results suggest that similar neural abnormalities may 
underlie complex social judgments in both disorders.  This study also contributes to a more 
general body of work showing similar behavioral patterns of social cognitive deficits in 
schizophrenia and autism (Craig et al., 2004; Pilowski et al., 2000).  In regard to social 
functioning, here again striking similarities were seen between the two disorders with the 
exception that individuals with schizophrenia may be more able to live independently.  
Finally, both individuals with autism and individuals with schizophrenia showed increased 
levels of paranoid ideation as compared to controls.  
The comparable levels of paranoia in both clinical groups may explain the observed 
neural and behavioral similarities in current study.  In fact, only minimal differences in social 
cognition have been observed between individuals with autism and those with schizophrenia 
when the latter group was higher in paranoid symptoms.  Specifically, Craig et al. (2004) 
recruited only individuals who were experiencing paranoid delusions and found comparable 
deficits across both schizophrenia and HFA on two different ToM tasks.  Similarly, the 
schizophrenia sample in Pilowsky et al. (2000) was comprised of predominately children 
with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, and this study found comparable deficits in both 
clinical disorders across a simple task of ToM.  In contrast, Bolte and Poustka (2003) failed 
to find similar degrees of impairment on an emotion perception task; however, the symptom 
presentation of the schizophrenia sample was not detailed, and an effort to recruit only 
individuals with paranoid symptoms was not reported.  
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Heightened paranoia may also help explain the similar reductions in neural activation 
seen in both disorders and the apparent disconnect between reduced amygdala activation 
despite more negative ratings of trustworthiness.  It may be the case that individuals with 
paranoia have a higher threshold of threat for amygdala activation and may require extremely 
threatening stimuli in order to evoke a response from this brain region.  Given that paranoid 
individuals are perceiving threat frequently and regularly in their daily lives, it is possible 
that their amygdalae may have habituated to these high levels of threat and are therefore not 
showing sensitivity to lesser threats such as judging trustworthiness from a face.  Thus, it is 
also possible that if given a threatening enough stimulus, paranoid individuals may show 
normative amygdala activation; however, this hypothesis is merely speculative and requires 
further investigation.  
These results also potentially underscore the need for a symptom based approach in 
the study of clinical disorders.  As Bentall et al. (1988, 2001) point out, studies characterizing 
samples based on a simple diagnosis of schizophrenia have done little to inform the etiology 
of the disease process.  Additionally, the absence of a unique biochemical or structural 
marker that is specific to schizophrenia (Brune, 2004), and the considerable symptomatic 
heterogeneity present in schizophrenia, suggest that a diagnostic approach may not be 
optimal for exploring developmental pathways.  As applied here, a symptom based approach 
may propose that paranoid ideation and a long standing paranoid perceptual process may 
serve as the mechanism for the equifinality found between the two disorders in neural 
activation and social cognitive outcome.
The present study has several limitations.  First, all individuals in the schizophrenia 
group were taking neuroleptic medication which may have affected neural activation.  Future 
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work should seek to explore the overall effects of atypical antipsychotic medication on the 
BOLD response and should specifically seek to understand how these medications may 
influence functioning of the social cognitive circuit.  Additionally, this study examined only 
specified regions of interest that have previously been implicated in social cognition.  It is 
possible that whole brain analyses may have gleaned more information regarding similarities 
and differences between schizophrenia and autism; however, the lack of differences found 
here would suggest that larger sample sizes would be needed to adequately test all neural 
regions.  Finally, perhaps the main limitation of this study is that the reductions in neural 
activation seen in the clinical groups cannot be specified as being solely due to problems in 
social information processing.  One could argue that individuals with schizophrenia and HFA 
would show reduced neural activation during any task and that these reductions could be 
evident across all neural regions.  Future studies would benefit from the inclusion of a non-
social control task that could be used to establish normative levels of activation in clinical 
groups that could then clarify differential deficits when processing social stimuli.  
In conclusion, this study investigated both neural activation and behavioral 
performance during a task of complex social cognition in healthy controls, individuals with 
high-functioning autism, and individuals with schizophrenia.  The two clinical groups 
showed reduced neural activation in the amygdala, fusiform face area, and the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex.  No differences in neural activation or behavioral performance were noted 
between the clinical groups.  These findings suggest that individuals with schizophrenia and 
individuals with autism share similar neural profiles that may underlie social cognitive 
deficits.  Future work should continue to explore similarities and differences between 
schizophrenia and autism, and may particularly benefit from a symptom based approach that 
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might offer the best means of exploring etiology and developmental pathways.    
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 Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Characteristics
Controls (n=12) SCZ (n=12) HFA (n=12)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Ethnicity
  Caucasian 10 10 10
  African American 2 2 1
  Other 0 0 1
Marital Status
  Single 8 11 11
  Married 4 1 1
Age 27.08 (3.98) 26.42 (5.25) 24.08 (5.71)
Education 16.92 (1.98) 13.29 (2.73) 13.5 (1.83)
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Table 2  
Cerebral foci of activation within each ROI in response to the Trustworthiness Task
Coordinates (mm)*         Cluster
Side x y z           Size          Z Score
Control Group
AMY right  15 -6 -21 72 4.89
left -21 -3 -21 58 4.68
STS right  51 -39 -9  28 3.91
FFA right  45 -54 -36 120 5.05
VLPFC right  42  21 -18 26 4.23
left -42  21 -9  144 4.53
HFA Group
AMY right  24  0 -30 22 4.00
left -27 -3 -21 6 3.69
STS right  45 -30 -12 4 3.03
FFA right  42 -51 -36 54 4.01
VLPFC right  39  18  0 91 4.45
left -48  15 -12 88 4.48
SCZ Group
AMY right  21 -3 -24 46 4.02
left -18 -6 -21 38 4.14
STS right  54 -36 -15 24 3.55
FFA right  39 -51 -33 104 4.38
VLPFC right  39  24 -9  112 4.79
left -42  18 -9  34 4.17
All values, p<.05, FWE corrected for multiple comparisons across a small volume of interest.
* The cluster with the largest number of voxels with each ROI is reported.  Talairach 
coordinates refer to the voxel with the maximum signal change in each cluster.  
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics for Behavioral Measures
Controls (n=12) SCZ (n=12) HFA (n=12)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)           Mean (SD)
Trustworthiness Task
  Number rated as trustworthy 25.33 (4.98) 19.41 (6.01)           22.83 (6.41)
  Reaction Time (sec) 1.669 (.655) 2.135 (.902)           2.335 (1.10)
Social Functioning Scale
  Social Engagement .867 (.065) .656 (.117)            .667 (.195)
  Interpersonal Communication .991 (.032) .694 (.242)            .713 (.278)
  Pro-social Activities .535 (.169) .328 (.159)            .319 (173)
  Recreation .572 (.127) .433 (.119)  .493 (.153)
  Independence – Competence .981 (.031) .906 (.113)            .859 (.132)
  Independence – Performance .823 (.108) .716 (.152)            .654 (.155)
  Employment/Occupation .992 (.029) .617 (.411)            .950 (.117)
Cognitive Abilities
  WASI Full Scale IQ 122.75 (9.57) 100.00 (14.6)       112.42 (11.28)
  Reading Ability 112.58 (9.27) 103.83 (14.24)      110.00 (10.91)
Paranoia Scale 27.6 (5.27) 48.08 (20.48)         48.25 (21.18)
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Table 4  
Correlations between Amygdala Activation and Social Functioning Across All Groups
      Spatial Extent       Time Course
       of Activation Peak
Social Functioning Scale
  Social Engagement .234 .287*
  Interpersonal Communication .146 .244
  Pro-social Activities .075 .082
  Recreation .099 .101
  Independence – Competence .353* .415*
  Independence – Performance .161 .333*
  Employment/Occupation .182 .338*
* p < .05
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Behavioral and neural similarities between schizophrenia and autism.
Figure 2. Unique response of VLPFC and STS in controls for untrustworthy faces. A: 
statistical parametric map (SPM) overlaid on mean T1 anatomical image showing activation 
in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.  Left peak at x,y,z = -45, 21, -6; Z = 5.39, right peak at x,y,z
= 51, 27, -9; Z = 3.77.  Results are displayed using the ROI mask for the VLPFC.  B: mean 
response profiles for different event types from the VLPFC and STS ROIs.  Data derived 
from a finite impulse response (FIR) model with 2 second time bins.  For both, the peak time 
point for untrustworthy faces is significantly greater than the peak for trustworthy faces at 
p<.05.  C: SPM overlaid on mean T1 anatomical image showing activation in the STS that is 
unique to faces judged as untrustworthy.  Peak at x,y,z = 51, -33, -9; Z = 3.59.  Results are 
displayed using the ROI mask for the STS.  
Figure 3. Group differences in neural activation during trustworthiness judgments.  The first 
column shows statistical parametric maps overlaid on the mean T1 anatomical image 
showing activation in the right amygdala (x,y,z = 15, -9, -21; Z=3.22), right fusiform face 
area (FFA; x,y,z = 48, -57, -30; Z=2.88), and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC; 
x,y,z = -30, 18, -21; Z=3.13) in which control participants showed significantly greater 
activation than HFA participants.  The second column shows activation in the right amygdala 
(x,y,z = 18, -3, -21; Z=3.11), right FFA (x,y,z = 45, -57, -33; Z=2.88), and left VLPFC (x,y,z
= -30, 24, -18; Z=2.91) in which the control group showed significantly more activation than 
the schizophrenia group.  All SPM results are displayed using the appropriate ROI mask.  
The last column shows the means response profiles for each event type extracted from the 
amygdala, FFA, and VLPFC ROIs.  Data was derived from a FIR model with 2 second time 
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bins.  For both the amygdala and FFA, peak time points for the control group were 
significantly higher than the peaks for both clinical groups at p<.05.  For the VLPFC, the 
main effect of group was not significant (p=.275); however, the interaction between trust and 
group was significant and likely contributed to the SPM results.  
Figure 4. Interaction between trust rating and group.  Statistical parametric maps overlaid on 
mean T1 anatomical images show that when a face is rated as untrustworthy, only control 
participants show greater activation of bilateral VLPFC (right maxima: x,y,z = 39, 27, -3; 
Z=3.24; left maxima: x,y,z = -39, 27, 0; Z=5.42).  Results are displayed using the VLPFC 
mask.     
Figure 5. Peak response of event time courses from the amygdala, FFA, and VLPFC.  
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Figure 1. Social Cognition in Schizophrenia and Autism
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•ToM Deficits
•Personalizing Bias
•Social Perception Deficits:
•Emotion Perception
•Social Cue Perception
•Complex Social Judgments
•Related to Social Functioning
Autism
•ToM Deficits
•No attributional abnormalities
•Social Perception Deficits:
•Detection of Biological Motion
•Face Perception
•Emotion Perception
•Complex Social Judgments
•Related to Social Functioning
The Neural Basis of Social Cognition
•ToM – medial prefrontal cortex
•Face Processing – fusiform gyrus (FG) and    
superior temporal sulcus (STS)
•Complex Social Judgments – amygdala (AMY)
Schizophrenia
•Reduced activation of the FG
•Intact functioning of the STS
•Reduced activation of the AMY
Autism
•Reduced activation of the FG
•Reduced activation of the STS
•No activation of the AMY
Social Cognition
Figure 2. Unique Response of VLPFC and STS in Controls for Untrustworthy Faces
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Figure 3.  Group Differences in Neural Activation During Trustworthiness Judgments
Control > HFA
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Figure 4.  Interaction between Trust Rating and Group
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Figure 5.  Peak Response of Event Time Courses 
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